Information in the review is provided as of August 1, 2024
Summary
One of the main military events of July in the Belarusian Armed Forces were the completion of the so-called “combat readiness inspection” and the flights of Russian drones of the Shahed-136/131 type into Belarus. There is every reason to believe that the Shahed-136/131 flights will continue.
The level of Russia’s military presence hasn’t changed significantly in July. The personnel and equipment of the Russian Armed Forces, which participated in the military parade on July 3, returned to Russia. No increase in the number of the military group in Belarus has been recorded. The activity of units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in Belarus hasn’t changed and remains low.
Up to 100 mercenaries of PMC Wagner stay in Belarus, who continue to systematically train law enforcers of the Lukashenka regime. No other activity of the mercenaries has been recorded.
The general medium-term forecast of the military situation in Belarus remains the same. Currently, there is no reason to expect an offensive by the Russian Armed Forces from the territory of Belarus, as well as an increase in their military presence. Involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in combat operations against Ukraine is still unlikely. The significance of PMC Wagner as a destabilizing factor no longer exists.
Chapter 1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. Internal Troops
1.1. Organization of combat training
Combat readiness inspection
The activities related to the sudden combat readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces, which started on June 21, continued to develop. It should be noted that there were no reports about military activities within the framework of the inspection in July. All the activity was in the media space.
For example, on July 2, during the event dedicated to the celebration of Independence Day of Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka connected the concentration of Ukrainian troops near the border with “the arrival of a large contingent of servicemen from friendly countries to Belarus to participate in the events on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Belarus.” We should also mention the briefing on July 5 with the participation of the Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Uladzimir Kuprianyuk, on the situation at the Belarus-Ukraine border. In general, the official repeated the statements made earlier by other representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus.
On July 13, at a special meeting held in Luninets, Lukashenka announced the elimination of tension on the border with Ukraine. As a result of the meeting, it was ordered to withdraw units of the Belarusian Armed Forces from the border with Ukraine to the places of permanent deployment. At the same time, Special Operations Forces and a “small number” of duty forces will stay in the border area to monitor the situation on the border (for more details, see paragraph 1.3 of the review).
Thus, on July 13, the so-called “combat readiness inspection” ended.
When assessing the completed “inspection”, we should pay attention to the inconsistencies in the statements of some speakers. For example, on July 13, Chairman of the State Security Committee Ivan Tsertsel said that Ukraine started to withdraw its units from the border on July 3-4. At the same time, on July 5, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff Uladzimir Kuprianyuk said that the situation on the border remained tense. And at the time of Kuprianyuk’s statement, there was no talk about any de-escalation.
There is every reason to believe that the “sudden readiness inspection” and the escalation of the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border were part of the PSYOP, conducted ahead of the celebration of Independence Day in Belarus on July 3.
Other combat training activities
Other combat training activities included the following:
1) On July 10, a comprehensive combat readiness inspection of the Belarusian Air Force was held. During the inspection, they practiced the conditional defeat of air targets and forcing aircraft to land.
2) July is traditionally the period of field drills in the Belarusian Armed Forces. During the field drills, units are sent to training grounds for a long period of time (up to a month), where they are trained and drills are conducted. During the month, it was reported that field drills were conducted with: artillery units of the Western Operational Command, mechanized battalions and anti-aircraft missile and artillery divizions of the 6th and 11th Mechanized Brigades, the 188th and 557th Engineering Brigades, the 814th Technical Support Center, the 147th and 740th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiments.
3) The 6th Mechanized Brigade was conducting training for FPV drone operators. After completing the training course, servicemen will be allowed to operate UAVs and will proceed to practical flights during combat training events.
4) Mechanized units of the Belarusian Armed Forces are training in a fortified area located near Saki village (Zhabinka district). The soldiers work in a two-sided confrontation format: some attack, while others hold the defense. During the drills, the servicemen apply tactics of modern combat and use UAVs. Soldiers of the 78th Separate Mechanized Battalion of the 6th Mechanized Brigade take part in the training.
5) Tactical drills were held in the 49th Radio-Technical Brigade under the guidance of the Chief of the Radio-Technical Troops. During the drills, the issues of improving the survivability of command posts and personnel, as well as the redeployment of units, were practiced. The drills took place in an environment of active confrontation with unmanned aviation and sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the conditional enemy. Car tires were used to increase the survivability of units and protect military equipment from FPV drone strikes.
6) Command-staff drills with the 11th Mechanized Brigade took place in Karelichy and Navahrudak districts (Hrodna region). During the drills, a tactical episode of storming a building and releasing hostages was practiced.
7) On July 29-31, tactical and specialty drills were held with the reconnaissance forces and means of the Western Operational Command. During the drills, new automated information collection and processing systems based on artificial intelligence were tested. All types of reconnaissance were practiced, including air reconnaissance (using UAVs) and electronic reconnaissance (using automation and control systems). In addition, they practiced counter-battery warfare and the use of FPV drones. The drills were planned and conducted taking into account the experience of the Russian Armed Forces gained during the war in Ukraine.
Training of Belarusian military specialists in Russia
In July, there was no information about training of Belarusian military specialists at training centers in Russia. According to the updated information, within the framework of the operational-tactical drills of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces, on August 11-25, units of the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and the 56th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment will perform combat launches from S-300, S-400, and Tor-M2K SAM systems on the territory of the Ashuluk training ground (Astrakhan oblast, Russia).
Drills involving military personnel of foreign states
1) On July 8-19, a joint Belarusian-Chinese “Attacking Falcon-2024” anti-terrorist trainingwas held at the Brestski training ground. Soldiers of the 38th Air Assault Brigade participated on the part of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
The first joint anti-terrorist training “Rapid Eagle” was held back in July 2011. Trainings under the names “Rapid Eagle” and “Attacking Falcon” were held in 2012, 2015, and 2018 in both Belarus and China. The break in the trainings was due to the COVID epidemic.
During the training, the servicemen practiced storming trenches and communication routes, parachuting from a helicopter, clearing the premises of a building, searching for and destroying sabotage and reconnaissance groups, etc. During the active phase of the training, Belarusian-Chinese groups practiced searching for the base camp of a conditional terrorist organization.
2) On July 13-20, over 50 servicemen of the 38th Air Assault Brigade took part in the joint “Pinnacle of Brotherhood-2024” drills, which were held at the Taktal training ground in Kazakhstan. Servicemen from Belarus and Kazakhstan took part in the drills. During the drills, combined units of Belarus and Kazakhstan practiced firearms and mountaineering training and studied the specifics of operations in mountainous and desert terrain.
Internal Troops, Border Guard bodies
Significant combat training activities include the following:
1) The soldiers of the 1st Militia Brigade took part in drills on the brigade’s participation in counter-terrorist operations. The soldiers marched to the specified area on the territory of Minsk region, set up blocking lines, and mastered the principles of service at checkpoints. Units’ commanders focused on improving the continuous and sustainable management of their subordinates.
2) Exercises with volunteers of the Chest’ special forces detachment are conducted systematically. The unit was formed in 2022 with members of the Chest’ Association of Veterans of Special Forces Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. PMC Wagner mercenaries and instructors from the Internal Troops are involved in the training. In July, exercises in military topography, engineering and tactical training, etc. are held with the volunteers.
Training of Belarusian enforcers by PMC Wagner mercenaries
Training of servicemen by PMC Wagner mercenaries continued in July.
It is known that the mercenaries continue to work with servicemen of the Internal Troops systematically. However, this cooperation is not publicly recognized. Earlier we wrote that the press service of the Internal Troops stopped mentioning PMC Wagner in its publications after Lukashenka’s criticism. Since the beginning of February 2024 and up to the present time, the mercenaries have been publicly referred to as “experienced instructors” or not mentioned st all.
For this reason, the ongoing cooperation with the Internal Troops can be assessed in other ways. For example, a Ukrainian Kozak-5/Kozak-7 armored vehicle could be seen in the photos from the completion of the combat coordination of the Vitsiaz special forces detachment. The vehicle was probably captured by PMC Wagner mercenaries during combat operations.
The vehicle shows no signs of having been used during drills or trainings (e.g. dirt marks, etc.). The vehicle looks absolutely new. Such equipment is not in service with the Belarusian law enforcers. Most likely, the vehicle was deliberately used as evidence of the continued presence of the mercenaries in Belarus.
For this reason, the ongoing cooperation can be judged by circumstantial evidence (mainly photos and videos). It is known that in July, the mercenaries conducted:
- a training course for company commanders and their deputies of military units of the Internal Troops;
- combat coordination of the Vitsiaz special forces detachment;
- exercises with the Chest’ special forces detachment, etc.
There were no reports of the mercenaries conducting training with the Belarusian Armed Forces.
1.2. Movements of military equipment and aviation activity
The main factors that affected the intensity of movements of military equipment and aviation activity in July were: 1) the flights of Russian UAVs of the Shahed-136/131 type into Belarus (for more details, see paragraph 1.11 of the review); 2) the military parade on July 3; 3) a number of military training activities (for more details, see paragraph 1.1 of the review).
The intensity of movements of military equipment remained almost at the same level compared to June. As in previous months, there was nothing unusual in movements of the equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Most of the movements are concentrated in the vicinity of the areas where the garrisons and training grounds of the Belarusian Armed Forces are located.
More details on the movements of military equipment are available on the map of military activity.
The intensity of movements of the Belarusian Armed Forces by rail increased twofold compared to June. During the month, trains with military equipment were recorded in Homiel, Brest, Asipovichy, as well as at the Kozenki (Mazyr), Lasosna (Hrodna), and Homiel-Niatsotny stations.
The intensity of flights of the Belarusian Air Force increased almost 1.5 times compared to June. Lida, Baranavichy and Machulishchy airfields were mainly used for flights, while Luninets, Ziabrauka, Barautsy and Babruisk airfields were used less frequently.
The following notable features of aviation activity can be noted:
1) During the month (on July 1, 2, 13, 14, 25), flights of helicopters of the 50th Combined Air Base of the Belarusian Air Force continued to be recorded near the western and southern borders of Belarus.
2) On July 3, 13 aircraft (Su-25 attack aircraft, Yak-130 and L-39 combat trainers) of the 116th Assault Air Base of the Belarusian Air Force returned to Lida airfield. The aircraft had been stationed at Machulishchy airfield since June 20 and took part in the military parade on July 3.
3) On July 21, two Su-25 attack aircraft of the Belarusian Air Force arrived at Barautsy airfield from Lida airfield. On July 25, the aircraft returned to the airfield. It should be noted that the Belarusian military use Barautsy airfield less frequently.
4) On July 24, a Mi-8 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force arrived at the former Dretunskiy training ground (Vitsiebsk region) from Machulishchy airfield. The purpose of the arrival is unknown.
Separately, we can mention the aviation activity due to the flights of Russian UAVs of the Shahed-136/131 type into Belarus (for more details, see paragraph 1.11 of the review). We note that due to the Shahed-136/131 flights, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters of the Belarusian Air Force were on duty almost daily at Babruisk airfield on July 15-26. The reason is the desire to reduce the flight time to the border with Ukraine to intercept Russian UAVs flying into Belarus. Mostly helicopters arrived at the airfield early in the morning and left late in the evening. The choice of Babruisk airfield is not accidental, as it is the closest to the border with Ukraine.
On July 26, the duty of helicopters of the Belarusian Air Force at Babruisk airfield stopped. But on July 31, after new flights of UAVs into Belarus, it was resumed.
1.3. The group of the Belarusian Armed Forces deployed in the border regions
The presence of the Special Operations Forces in the regions of Belarus bordering Ukraine continues. Despite the fact that the military are officially declared to be performing border protection tasks, at the same time they are covering Russian military facilities in Homiel region.
Additional forces of the Belarusian Armed Forces deployed during the so-called “combat readiness inspection” were withdrawn from the area bordering Ukraine (for more details, see paragraph 1.1 of the review). As of August 1, one of the battalions of the 103rd Airborne Brigade was deployed in the vicinity of Ziabrauka airfield (Homiel district). The unit arrived in Homiel district in early July as part of another rotation. In turn, units of the 5th Special Forces Brigade continue to be stationed in the vicinity of Mazyr. The total number of these units can still be estimated at 400-500 people.
It should be noted that the units of the 103rd Airborne Brigade have been continuously deployed in the vicinity of Ziabrauka airfield since the end of April 2024. The units of the 38th Air Assault Brigade temporarily ceased to be involved in these tasks, as the brigade’s servicemen took part in a number of international drills (for more details, see paragraph 1.1 of the review). One can expect that the next rotation of the units of the Special Operations Forces in Homiel region will take place in early September.
We recall that units of the Special Operations Forces will be stationed in Mazyr and Homiel districts until the end of 2024. Currently, there are no reasons to claim that the number of the group of the Belarusian Armed Forces stationed near the border with Ukraine may increase. The number of units stationed there has been static for many months.
1.4. Territorial defense and national home guard. Military commissariats
Territorial defense. National home guard
No drills with the territorial defense were reported during the month. It became known that in August-September, such drills will be held in:
- Orsha district (Vitsiebsk region). It is planned to draft 110 reservists to the training session.
- Kamianets district (Brest region). It is planned to draft 140 reservists to the training session.
We should note a peculiarity of the planned drills in Kamianets district. The region borders Poland. Previously (in March-April), a training session with conscripts of the territorial troops was held in Voranava district (Hrodna region), bordering Lithuania. It is notable that in 2022 and 2023, drills with the territorial troops were not held in areas that border EU/NATO states. There is nothing surprising in this new practice, since the Lukashenka regime is constantly talking about the militarization of Western countries and military threats to Belarus. For this reason, more attention was paid to the organization of the territorial defense in the border regions of western Belarus.
Also, during the month, it was reported on a training session on the participation of internal affairs bodies in the formation of national home guard detachments. In general, we can note the intensification of the process of formation of the national home guard. We should recall, for example, the statement of the Chairman of the Minsk Regional Executive Committee made in June, saying that all preparatory measures for the establishment of the national home guard in the region would be carried out by October 1.
Military commissariats
Mobilization drills will be held with the military commissariats of Vitsiebsk region from July 31 to August 9. It was reported on the drills back in April. Before the drills, summonses to appear at the military commissariat will be sent to conscripts at their places of residence. Notification will also be carried out by sending SMS-messages. About 200 reservists will be drafted.
During the month, it was reported that mobilization readiness inspections of centers for notification and collection of conscripts were carried out. Such events were held in Mahiliou region.
Due to technical work on the pravo.by website, it is temporarily impossible to get up-to-date statistics on the number of criminal cases against conscripts who evaded conscription for compulsory military service. At the same time, official statistics show that the number of citizens evading compulsory military service is decreasing every year. For example, since the beginning of 2024, 26 people have been prosecuted for evading conscription in Brest region, while for the whole 2023 – 128 people.
1.5. Military training sessions with reservists
Training sessions with reservists were reported in the following units in July:
- The 48th Separate EW Battalion (19 reservists);
- The 815th Technical Support Center (18 reservists);
- The 120th Mechanized Brigade (50 reservists);
- The 108th Separate Material Support Regiment (10 reservists);
- The 127th Signal Brigade (territorial) (19 reservists);
- The 120th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (10 reservists);
- The 7th Engineering Regiment (32 reservists);
- Military commissariats of Vitsiebsk region (mobilization drills; 200 reservists);
- The 11th Mechanized Brigade (20 reservists).
In total, at least 378 people were drafted to the training sessions in these units.
There was also information that military commissariats of Vitsiebsk region sent 6 reservists to a military training session.
Thus, the total number of reservists drafted to military training sessions in July can be at least 384 people. And in total since the beginning of 2024 – 9422 people. We note that this is the minimal number of reservists who have undergone military training sessions. In reality, their number may be several times higher, since open sources publish only fragmentary data on conscription to military training sessions.
The Ministry of Defense of Belarus hasn’t reported the number of conscripts to be drafted to military training sessions in 2024. A total of 9000 people were planned to be drafted to training sessions in 2023.
1.6. Supplies of new weapons to the troops. Work of the military-industrial complex of Belarus
Supplies of new weapons to the troops
No supplies of new weapons to the troops were reported in July.
Announced plans for rearmament
The following rearmament plans were announced in July:
1) On July 8, the head of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops Department of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces Command said that “Buk-MB SAM systems will be delivered to the troops in the near future.” The official also made a similar statement in early May 2024.
2) The Ministry of Defense of Belarus plans to purchase a batch of 10-inch Chimera CX10 FPV drones from the Chinese company iFlight by the end of 2024. One drone costs $329.99 in the official online store of the company. However, the Ministry of Defense plans to spend ≈BYN 460,000 ($8,951) each to purchase 16 Chimera CX10. We may assume that the Chimera CX10 will be used to train FPV drone operators in the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Activity of the military-industrial complex
On July 25, a meeting of the temporary interdepartmental working group on the development of the Strategy for the Development of Unmanned Systems and the Comprehensive Program for the Development of Unmanned Systems was held at the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus.
1.7. Development of military infrastructure. Formation of new units. Staffing of troops with personnel
On July 16, at the ceremony honoring graduates of higher military educational institutions and senior officers, Aliaksandr Lukashenka said that “in the coming two years, the state will do everything to ensure that you [the military] have a strong rear.” Lukashenka also said that they “will continue to develop, strengthen and improve our Armed Forces, also taking into account the experience of combat operations.”
Development of military infrastructure
1) In 2026, the repair and modernization of the infrastructure of the 2766th fuel base of the Belarusian Armed Forces (military unit 55461), located in Zhlobin district, should be completed. The project implementation started back in 2019. However, in 2022, the construction was stopped for unknown reasons. In 2024, the realization of the project, financed from the budget of the “Union State”, was resumed. Modernization of the base’s infrastructure will make it possible to increase production capacity for fuel delivery to the troops.
2) The Babruisk Operational Department of the Belarusian Armed Forces is holding tenders to organize repair works of the facilities of the 465th Missile Brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces (military unit 61732) stationed in Asipovichy. In particular, it is planned to repair the guardhouse and control-technical point.
We recall that in early June, it became known about the construction of two new storage facilities for the Iskander-M missile systems in Asipovichy. The construction of the facilities continues. As of July 6, the second storage facility for the equipment was covered with a roof. Construction of other facilities of unknown (so far) purpose is also continuing on the territory of the military town.
3) Repair of the runway started at Machulishchy airfield. According to satellite images, the work started on July 16. It is planned to replace about 150 meters of the runway. In total, from 2021 to 2024, about 510 meters of runway will have been replaced at the airfield. It should be noted that the entire length of the airfield runway is 3000 meters.
Development of border infrastructure
In 2024, the State Border Committee of Belarus has planned to prepare for the construction of two new border outposts on the Belarus-Ukraine border. The facilities will be located in Loyeu and Naroulia districts of Homiel region. One of the outposts will be built from scratch. The second outpost has already been formed, but is currently located on temporary infrastructure (in modular containers).
Since 2022, the strengthening of border infrastructure on the Belarus-Ukraine border has been intensified.
In addition, in 2024, the State Border Committee also plans to start construction of an equipment repair shop in Dziarzhynsk. The Material and Technical Support Group of the Border Guard Bodies (military unit 1463) is located in the town.
Formation of new units.
On June 27, a ceremony of graduation was held at the Military Faculty of Belarusian State Academy of Aviation. The faculty trains specialists in controlling UAVs. In the photo from the graduation ceremony, one could notice a graduate with the arm badge of the 231st Artillery Brigade. The brigade is part of the Northwestern Operational Command of the Ground Forces and is stationed in Barouka, Lepel district.
Sending a specialist to the brigade may mean that the UAV detachment in the 231st Brigade has either already been formed or its formation will be completed in the near future. It may also indicate the formation of relevant units in other artillery brigades of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
1.8. Tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus
There were no events related to TNWs in Belarus in July. Representatives of the Lukashenka regime continue to claim that TNWs are deployed in Belarus.
As we have repeatedly previously noted, currently there is still no reliable data that would confirm the deployment of TNWs on the territory of Belarus.
1.9. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere
No amendments to military legislation were reported in July.
1.10. International military cooperation
July was full of events of international military cooperation. The events related to Belarus-China military cooperation were especially remarkable.
For example, military delegations from Uzbekistan, Cuba and Egypt paid official visits to Belarus. Within the CIS, a regular meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS member states was held in Minsk.
Other events of international cooperation included:
1) On July 3-5, a working meeting was held in Mahiliou region between representatives of the main organizational and mobilization directorates of the General Staffs of the Russian Armed Forces and Belarusian Armed Forces. Within the framework of the meeting, the parties discussed a number of issues of joint work of defense agencies.
2) The development of relations with China deserves special attention. On July 1, the Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces held a protocol meeting with the Defense Attache at the Chinese Embassy in Belarus.
On July 6-8, a delegation of the General Department of Training and Administration of the Central Military Council of the People’s Republic of China visited Minsk. On July 8, negotiations were held on the organization of the training process, as well as on the improvement of the training system in military educational institutions of Belarus and China. The prospects of Belarus-China interaction on the issues of joint training of military personnel were also discussed. On July 11-13, a delegation of the United Logistics Forces of the People’s Liberation Army of China visited Minsk.
3) A delegation of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, headed by the Chief of the Main Directorate of Construction Projects, paid a visit to Belarus. During the visit, a meeting between the head of the Engineering Troops Directorate of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces and the delegation took place. The parties discussed the prospects for cooperation in the field of engineering support. The Iranian delegation also visited the anti-mine center of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
1.11. Flights of Russian UAVs of the Shahed-136/131 type into Belarus
During the month, Russian UAVs of the Shahed-131/136 type repeatedly flew into the airspace of Belarus, which were launched during missile strikes against the territory of Ukraine.
— In the evening of July 11, a UAV of the Shahed-136/131 type flew into Belarus. The UAV was in the country’s airspace for at least 1 hour.
— On the night of July 12-13, a Russian UAV of the Shahed-136/131 type flew into the airspace of Belarus. The UAV flew over the territory of Belarus for more than 350 kilometers. It is unknown what happened to the UAV afterwards.
— On the night of July 16, a UAV flew into Belarus from Ukraine. The Shahed-136/131 spent about 50 minutes over the territory of Belarus, after which it flew to the territory of Ukraine.
— In the morning of July 16, a UAV of the Shahed-136/131 type flew into the territory of Belarus from Zhytomyr region (Ukraine). Then the UAV flew to Mahiliou, and the emergency notification system went off in the city. Later, the UAV fell on the territory of Aktsiabrski district (Homiel region), 120 kilometers from the border with Ukraine. It is known that there was an explosion during the fall.
— On the night of July 30-31, the most massive flight of the Shahed-136/131 drones into the airspace of Belarus took place. We are talking about at least five UAVs. One UAV flew over 260 km across Belarus, the others flew to Ukraine after a short time.
Thus, out of 9 Shahed-136/131 drones, which flew into Belarus on July 11-31: 1 fell in Belarus; 7 flew to the territory of Ukraine; the fate of 1 is unknown.
The information that the Shahed-136/131 was flying in Mahiliou region on July 16 was indirectly confirmed by the regional department of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. There were no other comments from representatives of the state agencies on the flights of UAVs.
As for the reasons for the flights of the UAVs into Belarus, the expert community expressed a number of opinions. Both political (Moscow “waved a finger” at Lukashenka for sending signals to the West) and technical (technical malfunctions of the drones; due to the work of Ukrainian EW systems (for example, the Pokrova GPS spoofing system) the drones changed their flight trajectory and flew into Belarus). Each of the versions has its own set of arguments. In our opinion, the most probable reason for the Shahed-136/131 flights into Belarus is technical.
Despite the lack of an official reaction from officials of the Lukashenka regime, the military started taking preventive actions to neutralize the threat posed by drone flights. Here we can note the flight of a Su-30SM fighter to the south of Belarus during another missile attack against Ukraine, as well as helicopters’ duty at Babruisk airfield (for more details, see paragraph 1.2 of the review). The latter may be related to the intention to reduce the flight time to the border with Ukraine to intercept drones flying into Belarus.
Chapter 2. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
2.1. Russian group in Belarus
The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus didn’t change in July compared to previous months.
Russian military continue to be stationed at Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields. According to available information, one anti-aircraft missile divizion of the 1530th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces (military unit 31458) is stationed at each of the airfields. The regiment is part of the Eastern Military District and was redeployed to Belarus to take part in the Union Resolve-2022 drills back in early February 2022. We may assume that at the end of July, another rotation of the Russian military stationed in Belarus took place (for more details, see paragraph 2.2 of the review).
The presence of the Russian military at Ziabrauka airfield is confirmed by regular movements of vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces in Mazyr and its vicinity. So far, it hasn’t been publicly reported in what status the Russian military are present at the airfields.
In June, parade teams of the Russian Armed Forces (up to 20 artillery systems) arrived in Belarus to participate in the military parade on July 3. As expected, after the parade was over, the personnel and equipment returned to Russia (for more details, see paragraph 2.2 of the review).
Thus, as of August 1, 2024, the number of Russian military personnel stationed in Belarus can be estimated at about 2000 people. Of these:
- at Baranavichy airfield – up to 50 people;
- Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields – up to 500 people;
- at the 474th Baranavichy separate radio-technical node (70M6 Volga radar station, military unit 03522) and Russian Navy’s 43rd Vileika communication center (military unit 49390) – up to 1450 people.
Also, the following Russian military law enforcement agencies continue to work in Belarus: the 484th Military Investigation Department (Kletsk district, Minsk region) and the 313th Military Prosecutor’s Office of the garrison (Minsk). The number of personnel involved in these structures could be estimated at dozens of people.
2.2. Movements of military equipment and aviation activity
The intensity of movements of military equipment by public roads didn’t change compared to June. Regular movements of equipment of the Russian Armed Forces have been recorded mostly in Mazyr district, where the Russian Armed Forces are permanently deployed (for more details, see paragraph 2.1 of the review). Separately, we can note a convoy of equipment of the Russian Armed Forces, which was moving along the M5 highway towards Babruisk on July 4.
More details on the movements of military equipment are available on the map.
No movements of the Russian Armed Forces by rail were recorded. However, at least 1 military cargo train with personnel and equipment that participated in the military parade on July 3 could have departed from Minsk to Russia .
In July, the aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces decreased almost twofold compared to June. This was primarily due to the reduction in the number of the aviation group of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus.
Transport and passenger aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces and Russia’s Rosgvardiya kept arriving in Belarus. Most of them are not connected with military activity in Belarus:
- Machulishchy airfield: passenger aircraft – 1 Tu-134, 1 Tu-214PU-SBUS (the aircraft’s arrivals were connected with the participation of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in the meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS member states); transport aircraft – 2 Il-76.
- Baranavichy airfield: transport aircraft – 1 Il-76; passenger aircraft – 3 Tu-134.
- Minsk National Airport: transport aircraft – 1 An-12 (probably arrived to visit Minsk Civil Aviation Plant No.407).
- Hrodna airport: passenger aircraft – 1 Tu-134AK.
- Homiel airport: transport aircraft – 1 An-12.
The following features of aviation activity can be noted:
1) Flights of Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces (including in the southern regions of Belarus) on July 1, 3, 30-31.
2) On July 30, an An-12 military transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived at Homiel airport from Russia. It is possible that the arrival of the aircraft may be connected with another rotation of the Russian contingent located at Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields. Previously, we recorded the rotation of the Russian military in December 2023, March and June 2024.
During the month, the following changes in the composition of the aviation group of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus were noted:
1) On July 3, 11 fighters (5 MiG-29 and 6 Su-30SM) of the “Strizhi” and “Vityazi” aerobatic groups of the Russian Aerospace Forces flew from Baranavichy airfield to Russia. The aircraft had been in Belarus since June 25 and took part in the military parade on July 3.
2) On July 3, 11 helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces (5 Mi-28, 5 Ka-52 and 1 Mi-26) of the 344th center of combat training and retraining of the air personnel of the army aviation flew from Machulishchy airfield to Russia. The helicopters had been in Belarus since June 21 and took part in the military parade on July 3.
As we suggested earlier, all the aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which took part in the parade on July 3, returned to Russia.
As of August 1, the following aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently stationed on the territory of Belarus:
- at Lida airfield – one Su-25 attack aircraft;
- at Baranavichy airfield – 4 Su-30SM fighters.
A total of 5 aircraft. It should be noted that the presence of the Su-25 attack aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces at Lida airfield requires additional confirmation.
General conclusions
- In July, one of the main events for the Belarusian Armed Forces was the completion of the so-called “combat readiness inspection” and the escalation of the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border. As we noted in the review for June, the inspection had signs of a planned PSYOP. The available information confirms this conclusion.
In general, the events that took place in July were not out of the logic of current processes. The exception is the flights of Russian Shahed-131/136 UAVs into Belarus. The available information allows us to state that the Russian military don’t warn their Belarusian colleagues about possible flights of UAVs into the territory of Belarus. Therefore, the Belarusian Air Force has to take measures (to escort the flying UAVs, to organize special duty of helicopters, etc.). We may assume that Shahed-136/131 flights into Belarus will continue until the Russian military: 1) eliminate existing vulnerabilities / modernize their UAVs; 2) adjust the tactics of their use.
Separately, we should mention the intensification of Belarusian-Chinese military cooperation. For example, two Chinese delegations visited Belarus in July. A joint anti-terrorist training was held at the training ground near Brest after a 6-year break.
The general direction of the national security activities implemented by the Lukashenka regime indicates an increasing (in the regime’s opinion) probability of Belarus’ participation in the war.
- The general conclusion on the situation with the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Belarus didn’t change. All the conclusions given in the review for February remain valid.
No increase in the number of the Russian group in Belarus has been recorded. At the same time, the units stationed at airfields in Homiel region continue to undergo rotations.
The personnel and equipment that participated in the military parade on July 3 returned to Russia. The information about the upcoming transfer of Russian troops to Belarus by rail, which was reported in May 2024, hasn’t been confirmed yet.
The level of activity of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus in July can be described as low.
- All the conclusions regarding the prospects for the deployment of PMC Wagner mercenaries in Belarus given in the review for October 2023 remain valid. A small number of the mercenaries (up to 100 people) are still stationed in Belarus, who serve as instructors for Belarusian military structures. As before, the Internal Troops established the closest cooperation with the mercenaries. There are no signs of a complete shutdown of mercenaries’ activities in Belarus.
The level of activity of PMC Wagner in Belarus in April can be described as very low.
