Information in the review is provided as of December 1, 2024
Summary
November is traditionally a month in which no notable combat training activities take place. The main focus in the Belarusian Armed Forces was concentrated around two issues: 1) summarizing the results of the 2023/2024 academic year and planning for the 2024/2025 academic year in the troops; 2) conducting initial military training with recruits drafted during the fall conscription.
The main theme of the 2024/2025 academic year will be the preparation for the Belarus-Russia West-2025 drills. The inspection activities of units of the Belarusian Armed Forces were also announced. As the practice of the last 2 years shows, the intensity of combat training only increases every year.
The month was full of events related to the rearmament of the army. In November, the Belarusian military received new SAM systems, EW systems, UAVs, and communications equipment. There was information about deliveries of modernized MLRS to the troops. The vast majority of this equipment was produced in Belarus.
Russian Shahed-131/136 UAVs continued to fly into Belarus. A total of 151 UAVs (mostly of the Shahed type) flew in in November. There is a tendency towards an increase in the number of drones. Currently, there is no reason to claim that the situation will be radically resolved in the coming months. The number of Russian Shahed-131/136 drones in the Belarusian sky will only increase.
Currently, the general medium-term forecast of the military situation in Belarus remains the same. There is no reason to expect an offensive by the Russian Armed Forces from the territory of Belarus, as well as an increase in their military presence. Involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in combat operations against Ukraine is still unlikely.
The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus in November did not change fundamentally compared to previous months. As of December 1, 2024, the number of the Russian military in Belarus can be estimated at ≈ 2000 people. At least 4 Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently deployed at Baranavichy airfield. The most notable events of the month were a regular rotation of the Russian contingent, as well as the inspection of Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields.
No increase in the number of the Russian group in Belarus has been recorded. The main factor that can significantly change the situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus is the West-2025 drills.
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.
1.1. Combat training
Being the last month of the academic year in the troops, there were hardly any notable combat training activities in November. In the context of combat training, the main focus in the Belarusian Armed Forces was concentrated around two issues: 1) summarizing the results of the 2023/2024 academic year and planning for the 2024/2025 academic year in the troops; 2) conducting initial military training with recruits drafted during the fall conscription.
In the context of summarizing the results of the 2023/2024 academic year, two events should be noted. First, it was an operational training session for the command staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, which was held on November 13-14 at the 30th Railway Brigade in Slutsk. The purpose of the event was called “development of unified approaches to the training of officials of military administration bodies and troops, taking into account the orientation of the training of the Armed Forces, the organization of daily activities in the process of fulfilling the assigned tasks in the new academic year.” Such events are traditionally held at the end of each academic year.
During the training session, there was a display of weapons and military equipment that reflects the modern realities of combat operations. Participants were shown various UAVs and EW equipment. Most of the wheeled and tracked military vehicles on display were equipped with various types of anti-drone protection.
During the training session, a meeting of the board of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus was held, which summarized the results of training of the Belarusian Armed Forces in 2023/2024 and set tasks for the 2024/2025 academic year. The 2024/2025 academic year was declared the year of military proficiency. The main event of the training of the Belarusian Armed Forces in 2025 will be the Belarus- Russia West-2025 drills. It is also planned to carry out a set of activities “in accordance with the plan of preparation, sudden inspections and response to all those sudden tasks that may arise.”
Secondly, it was a combat training session, which was held on November 19-21 in Hrodna district. The following was declared as the topic of the training session: “Training in the most effective techniques and methods of performing combat tasks, taking into account the experience of combat operations during the [war] in Ukraine.” Their purpose was to introduce the methodology of the exercises and the procedure for improving the training and material base, to provide the trainees with reference material, and to show variants, peculiarities of training, tactical techniques and methods taking into account the experience of the war in Ukraine.
The events also reflected the modern realities of combat operations. For example, the participants considered such issues as target designation and aviation guidance, counter-battery warfare, firing from armoured combat vehicles from closed firing positions, the specifics of the organization of air defense and the training of units of military air defense in conducting combat operations, tactical medicine and the psychological training of servicemen.
1.2. Movements of military equipment. Aviation activity
The intensity of recorded movements of military equipment decreased almost twofold compared to October. This is due to the fact that practically no combat training activities were conducted in November.
There was nothing abnormal in movements of the equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Most of the movements were concentrated in the vicinity of large garrisons (Minsk, Barysau, Baranavichy). Minor activity of movements of equipment was noted in Homiel region (for more details, see paragraph 1.3 of the review).
More details on the movements of military equipment can be found on the map of military activity.
No movements of the Belarusian Armed Forces by rail were recorded.
The intensity of flights of the Belarusian Air Force remained practically at the same level compared to October. During the month, 197 flight activity events were recorded.
A “flight activity event” means the takeoff or landing of an aircraft or helicopter at an active airfield (airport) or landing sites located on terrain (including inactive airfields).
The following notable features of aviation activity can be mentioned:
1) On November 1, 10, 17, 19, 22, 24 and 25, flights of fighters of the Belarusian Air Force from Baranavichy airfield were recorded in the southern and southeastern regions of Belarus. Part of these flights were related to interceptions of Russian UAVs (for more details, see paragraph 5 of the review).
2) During the month (on November 5-8 and November 26-30), 2 Mi-8 helicopters of the Belarusian Air Force arrived at Luninets airfield from Machulishchy airfield.
1.3. Military commissariats
As for the Belarusian Armed Forces in general, there was no noticeable activity of military commissariats in November. During the month, at least 3 court verdicts were reported in criminal cases on evasion of conscription for compulsory military service (Article 435 (1) of the Criminal Code).
1.4. Territorial defense
No training sessions with conscripts of the territorial defense were held in November. As the practice of recent years shows, such training sessions are usually held in the period from March to September. Therefore, it can be expected that no such events will be held in the coming months.
The most notable event was the information that servicemen of the Internal Troops held exercises with representatives of the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen in Naroulia (Homiel region). During the exercises, elements of tactical and military-medical training were practiced, as well as skills in using weapons from various shooting positions. Practical performance of firing exercises from hunting rifles was also carried out.
Previously, it was repeatedly reported about military training with members of the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen. The report above was one of the first public confirmations that such work is indeed carried out.
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
There were practically no reports about military training sessions with conscripts in November. During the month, there was only information that military commissariats of Minsk region sent 8 conscripts to a military training session.
The decrease in the intensity of military training sessions is primarily connected with the end of the academic year in the troops. At the same time, the intensification of activities on the training of the mobilization reserve can be expected already at the beginning of 2025.
No “court” sentences for evading military training sessions were reported in November. In total, there were at least three sentences under Article 436 of the Criminal Code in 2024.
Thus, the total number of reservists drafted to military training sessions in November can be at least 8 people. And in total since the beginning of 2024 – 12,390 people. We note that this is the minimal number of reservists who have undergone military training sessions. In reality, their number may be several times higher, since open sources publish only fragmentary data on conscription to military training sessions.
The Ministry of Defense of Belarus hasn’t reported the number of conscripts to be drafted to military training sessions in 2024. A total of 9000 people were planned to be drafted to training sessions in 2023.
1.6. Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces
A notable event in November was the ongoing rearmament of air defense units. As it became known, the 740th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment received new Belarusian-made battery command posts. The regiment is also expected to receive a batch of modernized Osa SAM systems. This news can be assessed as the beginning of the process of strengthening the combat potential and capabilities of the military air defense.
On November 21, another battery set of the Tor-M2K SAM system was delivered to Belarus from Russia. Its delivery was announced in early 2024. The system will be transferred to the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. Taking into account the new delivery, the Belarusian Armed Forces have 7 SAM battery sets. Of these, 5 battery sets are in the 1146th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, and another 2 batteries are in the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade.
In Belarus, the Tor-M2K SAM systems are used to cover strategically important facilities (BelNPP, Mazyr Oil Refinery). The delivery of another battery set to the 15th Brigade can be considered as further implementation of plans to supply all anti-aircraft missile units of the Belarusian Armed Forces armed with the S-300/S-400 short-range SAM systems. The purpose is to provide cover against air attack means for S-300/S-400 SAM divizions “during the conduct of maneuver combat operations.”
During the month, new information about the rearmament of the Missile and Artillery Troops also appeared. For instance, on November 21, Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin said that the serial production and delivery of the BelGrad-2 MLRS to the troops had been established. And on November 29, it became known that the 51st Artillery Brigade received the BM-21B BelGrad-2 MLRS. The number of the new MLRS in service was not reported. It is known that at the end of 2022, a rocket artillery battery armed with the BM-21 Grad MLRS was formed as part of the brigade. Apparently, the unit was recently rearmed with modernized BelGrad-2. In this case, we may be talking about 6 pieces.
The branch of the troops is being actively supplied with UAVs. According to Ruslan Chekhau, the head of the Department of Missile and Artillery Troops of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the artillery units will receive attack UAVs to perform counter-battery warfare tasks. According to Chekhau, UAVs are used at all levels of artillery units – from a mortar battery to an artillery brigade.
Supplies of UAVs and counter-UAV equipment to the troops continued. On November 6, it was reported that the 11th Mechanized Brigade received another batch of Chinese Chimera UAVs (at least 12 pieces). Their purchase for the Belarusian Armed Forces was reported in October 2024.
On November 28, the State Authority for Military Industry reported the delivery of another batch of the R-934UM2 Groza-6 automated jamming stations to the Belarusian Armed Forces. The number of transferred stations was not specified. Probably, two pieces of R-934UM2 were delivered to the troops. The State Authority for Military Industry also reported that the Belarusian Armed Forces would soon receive two more Groza-6 stations. And the total number of R-934UM2 in the Belarusian Armed Forces will be increased to ≈ 13 pieces.
In addition, the traditional transfer of new and modernized communication equipment to the Signal Troops took place. Representatives of 16 units of the Belarusian Armed Forces received new and modernized R-185 Epokha command-staff vehicles, R-142NMB Start combined radio stations, R-414MBRP Sosna-2 radio relay stations, E-350P mobile charging bases. The military also received ≈ 200 pieces of various wearable communication equipment, including MKS-T mobile communication systems (so-called “Belarusian analogues of Starlink”). Such events are held twice a year.
1.7. Tactical nuclear weapons
No new information related to TNWs in Belarus was received in November.
As we have repeatedly previously noted, currently there is still no reliable data that would confirm the deployment of TNWs on the territory of Belarus.
1.8. Formation of new units. Staffing of troops. Training of military specialists.
Formation of new units
No information on the formation of new units in the Belarusian Armed Forces was received in November. However, information about changes in the organizational and staff structure of some units was specified.
For example, on November 6, Commander of the Special Operations Forces Vadzim Dzenisenka, speaking about the specifics of combat training planned for the new academic year for the 38th Air Assault Brigade, said the following: “Given the receipt of new equipment, given the change in the organizational and staff structure [of the 38th Brigade].” It was not specified exactly what the change in the organizational and staff structure of the brigade consisted of.
Staffing of troops. Training of military specialists
The training of specialists in UAV control continued to intensify. For example, on November 6, it became known that courses on training of UAV operators were organized at the Military Faculty of the Belarusian Military Academy of Aviation. Teachers of the Military Academy, as well as military faculties (institutes) of educational institutions were trained. The courses focused on the organization and methods of training to operate multi-rotor UAVs.
From this we can conclude that the training of UAV operators will soon begin not only among the cadets of military education institutions, but also among the students who are undergoing training programs for junior commanders and reserve officers. The teacher’s preparation for training in UAV control can be considered a consequence of the meeting organized by the Ministry of Defense of Belarus in October. The meeting was precisely devoted to the organization of training of students in UAV operator training programs. It is currently unknown how this training will be organized.
On November 23, Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin said at the military oath-taking ceremony, “The problem of understaffing, which existed for some time in the Armed Forces, has been solved for two years now. Today there are more guys who are ready to serve in the army than there are positions.” Indeed, in recent years, the number of citizens who serve under contract in the Belarusian Armed Forces instead of compulsory military service has increased significantly.
1.9. Development of military infrastructure
In general, the development of the infrastructure of military towns continues. For example, “recently” the outpatient center of the 432nd Medical Center, the medical company of the 72nd Joint Training Center, the polyclinic with an infirmary at the Military Academy, etc. have been repaired and modernized.
New details about the construction of a military town in Homiel district are emerging. Recall that the facility is intended for: 1) units of the newly formed Southern Operational Command; 2) a new unit (brigade) of the Special Operations Forces. As it became known in November, it is planned to build a canteen for 680 seats for the military town. The construction of the facility costing about $3.93 million will be completed by March 2026. The stated capacity of the canteen (680 seats) allows it to provide meals to the soldiers of a unit (brigade).
A particular attention should be paid to the development of infrastructure of military town No.2 Paudniovy in Asipovichy, where missile and artillery units of the Belarusian Armed Forces (the 51st Artillery Brigade, the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade and the 465th Missile Brigade) are deployed. In June 2024, it became known about the construction of two storage facilities for military equipment. The new facilities are very similar to the storage facility for the Iskander-M missile system, which was built on the territory of the military town in 2022-2023.
The construction of new storage facilities indicates that Russia plans to continue transferring Iskander-M missile systems to Belarus. In total, the Belarusian Armed Forces may receive a brigade set of Iskander-M (3 missile divizions, 4 self-propelled launchers each). The published photos also showed the reconstruction of two administrative buildings, as well as the laying of foundations for new constructions of unknown purpose. The construction of these facilities is probably also related to the planned transfer of a new batch of Iskander systems to Belarus.
According to BELPOL, additional storage facilities for the Iskander-M missile system are being built on the territory of military town No.2 Paudniovy in Asipovichy. A total of 3 such storage facilities with maintenance stations have been built. Each of them is designed for the equipment of one missile divizion. In other words, the Belarusian Armed Forces will have three divizions of the Iskander-M missile systems in the future.
In addition, the reconstruction of the canteen (as a reception point for personnel) and barracks, major repairs of the warehouse, construction of three storage facilities for 100 vehicles (for the Tochka-U tactical missile systems and other equipment) with a warehouse for military technical equipment, as well as a sports and training complex are underway in military camp No.2 Paudniovy.
2. Internal Troops
Combat training
The “courses” under the guidance of former PMC Wagner mercenaries continue. For example, in November, an intensive combat training course for 2nd year cadets of the Internal Troops Faculty of the Military Academy was completed. Also in November, a training session on commande’’s training was held on the basis of the 3rd Special Forces Brigade (a set of training and educational activities aimed at improving the professional and methodological skills of officers). According to Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops Aliaksandr Bykau, the training courses are attended by officers of the Almaz anti-terrorism unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Presidential Security Service. It was noted that the training session program included classes on military psychology.
As can be seen, former mercenaries of PMC Wagner provide narrowly specialized training for all categories of servicemen of the Internal Troops (from cadets to brigade commanders). The peculiarity of the work of former mercenaries in the Internal Troops lies in the systematic nature of cooperation. For example, such close cooperation is not observed in the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Another area of combat training in November was the initial military training of new recruits drafted to serve in the Internal Troops in fall 2024. Here, it should be noted that servicemen of the Internal Troops are receiving primary skills in operating UAVs.
Personnel appointments
The most notable personnel change in November was the appointment of the commander of the 3rd Special Forces Brigade (military unit 3214), Dzmitry Miksha, as deputy commander of the Internal Troops. His predecessor in the post (Siarhei Hrabennikau) was dismissed from military service as a reserve officer with the right to wear military uniform and insignia.
Staffing of troops
On November 9, servicemen of the Internal Troops drafted for compulsory service during the fall conscription took the military oath. There was contradictory information about the total number of conscripts who were sent to staff units of the Internal Troops. On November 6, the press service of the Internal Troops said that “more than 1000 men will take the oath of allegiance to the Motherland.” And on November 9, this figure increased to “more than 1500 servicemen.” Based on the analysis of data from open sources, we can state that ≈ 1438 conscripts were sent to staff the units.
On November 29, a graduation ceremony was held at the Internal Troops Faculty of the Military Academy for students of junior officer training courses. A total of 30 servicemen completed the training, which lasted three months. According to the results of the final certification, they were awarded the first officer rank of “junior lieutenant.”
Work with “volunteers”
In November, active work with the so-called “volunteer units” continued. These units consist of former employees and servicemen of units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Internal Troops who are in reserve.
In particular, regular trainings were held with the volunteers. For example, a group of UAV operators from the Chest’ special forces detachment were trained in UAV control. Regular exercises in firearms, tactical, medical and engineering training were reported. The exercises were conducted by both instructors from the Internal Troops and former mercenaries of PMC Wagner.
3. Border Guard Bodies
Development of infrastructure
The network of border outposts on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border continues to expand. For example, the State Border Committee plans to build new outposts by the end of 2026:
- Sviacha – in Naroulia district (Homiel region);
- Karpauka – in Loyeu district (Homiel region);
- Selishcha – in Stolin district (Brest region).
It should be noted that Sviacha and Selishcha outposts will be built from scratch. The Karpauka outpost was formed back in September 2017. The peculiarity of the outpost is the modular location of all its facilities: part is located on land, part – on the water. Therefore, in this case we are talking about the construction of “stationary” infrastructure.
The intensification of the construction of new border outposts began after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Staffing of border guard bodies
One of the tools for the training of officers for the border guard service is the retraining of active servicemen (often warrant officers) at special courses. For example, on November 6, graduation of officers who had undergone retraining at the Faculty of Advanced Training and Retraining of the Institute of Border Guard Service took place. Upon completion of the courses, 23 servicemen were awarded the first officer rank of “lieutenant.”
4. Group deployed in the border regions. Situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border
In November, the situation with the group deployed in Homiel region did not change significantly. After the withdrawal of the main part of the units to the permanent deployment points in early November, no new units were redeployed to Homiel region. In addition, in early November, one of the units of the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade returned to its permanent deployment point.
As of December 1, it is known that one of the battalions of the 103rd Airborne Brigade is deployed in the vicinity of Ziabrauka airfield (Homiel district).
We should separately mention units of the Internal Troops, which have also been redeployed to the border with Ukraine. During the month, it was repeatedly reported that they were holding “patriotic” events and carrying out tasks in the areas of Homiel region bordering Ukraine.
In general, we can state that the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border returned to the status quo, which existed until August 2024. The essence of it was that 1-2 battalions of the Special Operations Forces were permanently deployed in Homiel region on a rotational basis. Their task was to guard Russian military facilities at Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields, as well as the ammunition arsenal (bases) of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
5. Flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus
In November, Russian UAVs continued to fly into the airspace of Belarus. It should be noted that UAVs were initially launched from the territory of Russia to attack Ukraine and to conduct reconnaissance. The flights of UAVs into Belarus are systematic.
During the month, flights of 151 Russian UAVs were recorded. Most of them were UAVs of the Shahed type. At least 3 reconnaissance UAVs were also detected. The flights of UAVs into Belarus’ airspace were recorded on November 1-6, 10-14, 16, 19-20, 22 and 24-28.
Of 151 UAVs:
- 82 subsequently flew to the territory of Ukraine;
- 3 were shot down by the air defense forces (Belarusian Armed Forces or Russian Armed Forces);
- 66 “disappeared” – there is no information about their further fate.
The Belarusian Air Force was not used to intercept UAVs on November 2, 4-6, 10-12, 14, 16, 19-20, and 26-28. It is known that on November 1, November 22 and November 25-26, at least 3 UAVs could have been shot down by the air defense forces.
There was no new information regarding the reasons for the flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus. Two versions remain the most probable: 1) Changed tactics of using UAVs by the Russian military. During missile attacks, Russian UAVs fly into the territory of Belarus (where they can’t be shot down by Ukrainian air defense units) to subsequently fly to the territory of Ukraine. Such actions may, for example, prolong the duration of missile attacks. 2) Due to the work of Ukrainian EW systems (e.g., the Pokrova GPS spoofing system).
We can note a trend towards an increase in the number of flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus. As of today, there is no reason to believe that flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus may stop anytime soon.
6. Work of former PMC Wagner mercenaries in Belarus
In November, training of servicemen of the Internal Troops by former PMC Wagner mercenaries continued. However, cooperation with the mercenaries is still not publicly recognized. Earlier we wrote that the press service of the Internal Troops stopped mentioning PMC Wagner in its materials after criticism by Aliaksandr Lukashenka. For this reason, from February 2024 until now, the mercenaries have been publicly referred to as “experienced instructors” or not mentioned at all.
For this reason, the ongoing cooperation can be judged by circumstantial evidence (mainly photos and videos). It is known that in November, the mercenaries conducted:
- exercises at a training session with volunteers of the Smerch special forces detachment;
- exercises with the new recruits of the 4th Militia Brigade.
There were no reports of former mercenaries conducting trainings with servicemen of the Belarusian Armed Forces and border guard bodies.
7. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
7.1. Russian group in Belarus
The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus didn’t change significantly in November compared to previous months.
Russian military continue to be stationed at Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields. According to available information, one anti-aircraft missile divizion of the 1530th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces (military unit 31458) is stationed at each of the airfields. The regiment is part of the Eastern Military District and was redeployed to Belarus to take part in the Union Resolve-2022 drills back in early February 2022.
The presence of the Russian military at MAzyr (Bokau) airfield is confirmed by regular movements of vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces in Mazyr and its vicinity. So far, it hasn’t been publicly reported in what status the Russian military are present at the airfields. At the same time, in March 2022, Lukashenka said that he had asked the Russian president to leave “some forces to cover the Homiel direction.”
We can note that at the end of November, there was probably a regular rotation of the Russian contingent located at Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields. This is indicated by the arrival of an An-12 military transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces at Homiel airport. On average, rotations take place every 1.5-2 months.
Another notable event was a flight of a helicopter on November 19 from “Site 400. Kupol,” located near Volma (Smaliavichy district), to Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields.
Note that one of the units of the 127th Signal Brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces is deployed in military town No.47A Volma (Volma, Smaliavichy district). In 2022, the joint headquarters of the Union Resolve-2022 drills was located in Volma (“Site 400. Kupol”). And later – the command post of the group of the Russian Armed Forces, which began the invasion of Ukraine from the territory of Belarus.
It is known that on November 19, the helicopter picked up passengers at “Site 400. Kupol” and then delivered them to Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields. From this we can conclude that another inspection of air defense units covering the southern border of Belarus in the airspace took place. It should be noted that the last time the airfields were “inspected” was back in late June, i.e. before the beginning of systematic flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus.
As of December 1, 2024, the number of Russian military personnel stationed in Belarus can be estimated at about 2000 people. Of these:
- the 474th Baranavichy separate radio-technical node (70M6 Volga radar station, military unit 03522, Aziarechcha, Kletsk district) – up to 1200 people.
- Russian Navy’s 43rd Vileika communication center (military unit 49390, vicinity of Vileika) – up to 250 people;
- Mazyr (Bokau) airfield – about 250 people;
- Ziabrauka airfield – about 250 people;
- Baranavichy airfield – about 30 people;
- the 313th Military Prosecutor’s Office of the garrison (Minsk, Azhura str, 4) – up to 10 people;
- the 484th Military Investigation Department (Aziarechcha, Kletsk district) – up to 10 people.
7.2. Movements of military equipment. Aviation activity
The intensity of movements of military equipment by public roads remained almost at the same level compared to October. The movements were related to the deployment of units of the Russian Armed Forces in Mazyr and Homiel districts (for more details, see paragraph 7.1 of the review). More details on the movements of military equipment can be found on the map.
No movements of the Russian Armed Forces by rail were recorded.
In November, the aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces decreased twofold compared to October. The following transport and passenger aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Russian Navy were recorded arriving in Belarus:
- Machulishchy airfield: passenger aircraft – 2 Tu-154;
- Baranavichy airfield: transport aircraft – 1 IL-76;
- Minsk National Airport: transport aircraft – 1 An-72;
- Homiel airport: transport aircraft – 1 An-12.
On November 23, Ukrainian sources reported about the redeployment of MiG-31K fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces to Belarus. This information does not correspond to reality. The last time MiG-31K arrived in Belarus was on October 9-10, 2024.
As of December 1, at least 4 Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently deployed in Belarus (Baranavichy airfield). No flights of fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces were recorded during the month.
