Military events review

Escalation on the Belarus-Ukraine border, drills with non-strategic nuclear forces, and preparations for the transfer of a new batch of Iskander systems: review of military events in Belarus in June

July 12, 2024 more than an hour to read

Information in the review is provided as of July 1, 2024

Summary.

The main military events of June in the Belarusian Armed Forces were participation in drills with non-strategic nuclear forces, a sudden combat readiness inspection, and an inspection of TNW carriers. 

The level of presence of the Russian Armed Forces slightly increased in June. The increase was connected with the arrival of the Russian military in Belarus to take part in the parade on July 3. As of the end of June, about 2500 Russian servicemen and an aviation group of 11 helicopters and 16 aircraft could be stationed on the territory of Belarus. The activity of units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in Belarus hasn’t changed and remains low.

Up to 100 mercenaries of PMC Wagner stay in Belarus, who continue to systematically train law enforcers of the Lukashenka regime. There is no other activity of the mercenaries.

The general medium-term forecast of the military situation in Belarus remains the same. Currently, there is no reason to expect an offensive by the Russian Armed Forces from the territory of Belarus, as well as an increase in their military presence. Involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in combat operations against Ukraine is still unlikely. The significance of PMC Wagner as a destabilizing factor no longer exists. At the same time, the situation on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border requires close monitoring, since it has the potential for further escalation and launching new processes (for example, the deployment of the Russian military contingent in Belarus).

Chapter 1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. Internal Troops

1.1. Organization of combat training

Combat readiness inspection

The main event of the combat training in June was the beginning of a sudden inspection of the readiness of the Belarusian Armed Forces to perform the assigned tasks.

It all started on June 20 with the statement of the State Security Committee that there was an increase in the Ukrainian military group near the border with Belarus. The next day, on June 21, the beginning of a sudden inspection of the readiness of formations and military units of the Belarusian Armed Forces to perform the assigned tasks was announced. According to Pavel Muraveika, the head of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, the inspection is of a comprehensive nature and provides for the interaction of heterogeneous forces. Special Operations Forces, Missile and Artillery Troops, Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops, as well as aviation units will be involved in the inspection. UAVs and EW means will also be actively used. 

The inspection will involve training grounds and terrain in Brest and Homiel regions. Given the geography of the inspection, it can be assumed that the inspection is a “response” to the alleged build-up of the Ukrainian military group on the border with Belarus. 

Later, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus reported that units of the Belarusian Armed Forces began to carry out combat training tasks to search for, block and destroy sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the conditional enemy, as well as to occupy defensive lines. They also practiced the issues of reinforcing the border sections in possible directions of illegal entry into the territory of Belarus by armed groups of militants, as well as blocking the channels for delivery of weapons and ammunition. It is notable that the Ministry of Defense Academy of Belarus passed off the rehearsal of the military parade on July 3 as an activity within the framework of the combat readiness inspection.

The escalation of the situation on the border started on June 28. The State Border Committee of Belarus said that there was the Russian Volunteer Corps near the border with Belarus. In Yelsk district (Homiel region, Belarus), the border guard stopped the flight of an unmanned aerial vehicle from Ukraine deep into Belarus after the use of “combat weapons and means of suppression.” Law enforcers also found a cache with components for making explosive devices. The video evidence of the events presented by the State Border Committee has all signs of being staged.

On the same day, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus said that a divizion of Polonez MLRS was redeployed to the area bordering Ukraine with full ammunition. The coordination of actions, as well as the nature of the statements allows us to state that the State Border Committee together with the Ministry of Defense of Belarus conduct a coordinated information and psychological special operation to escalate the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border. 

On June 29, the deputy commander of the Special Operations Forces of Belarus said that Ukraine was drawing troops to the borders of Belarus. And in the minefields created on the Belarus-Ukraine border, passages were left for the subsequent sending of sabotage and reconnaissance groups to Belarus to carry out sabotage and terrorist acts. The head of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops of the Belarusian Armed Forces said that due to an increase in the number of UAV flights in the northern part of Ukraine, as well as the increase of the Ukrainian group in the border area, additional units of the Belarusian air defense forces were sent to the border area.

Pavel Muraveika, the head of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, made a number of statements on June 29. According to the official, the situation on the southern border of Belarus is quite complicated. And it is getting worse every day. And special purpose units of the National Guard arrived in Ovruch (Zhytomyr region). According to Muraveika, such units “form real challenges, which can saturate our territory with sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and can conduct provocations.” On June 30, Pavel Muraveika added in an interview to the state media that there are 10 NATO battalion tactical groups near the Belarusian borders and that Belarus is ready to use nuclear weapons “if the sovereignty and independence of our country is threatened.”

Thus, the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border continues to be aggravated and deliberately escalated by the Lukashenka regime. As noted above, the ongoing inspection may be part of the PSYOP. 

It is possible that PSYOP is specially conducted on the eve of Independence Day in Belarus on July 3 to remind people about “external threats,” among other things. This PSYOP also fits a more global agenda. In the situation when the Russian offensive in Kharkiv region has failed and Moscow is ready to negotiate “even tomorrow”, it’s possible to frustrate the Ukrainian information space with a “threat from Belarus.”

At the same time, further escalation of the situation is also possible. For example, with the subsequent deployment of the Russian military contingent to the territory of Belarus to protect the borders of the Union State. We recall that in May, it was reported about the preparation of the railway infrastructure of Belarus to receive military cargo trains with the Russian military. 

Also, a provocation by the Belarusian security forces to provoke Ukraine to retaliate is not excluded. A “false flag” operation (by Belarusian security forces disguised as Ukrainians) is also possible.

It should be noted that despite all the belligerent rhetoric of the Lukashenka regime, no military personnel are drafted from the reserve to staff the units participating in the inspection. In other words, the military has not yet been assigned the task of working out mobilization measures.

As of the end of June, the following units were involved in the inspection: frontline aviation forces (several helicopters of the 50th Combined Air Base), a divizion of the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (S-300PS SAM systems), a rocket artillery battery (Grad MLRS) of the 51st Artillery Brigade, up to one divizion (Polonez MLRS) of the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade, up to a battalion of the 38th Air Assault Brigade, units of the 5th Special Forces Brigade, and other units. It should be noted that units of the Special Operations Forces have been performing tasks of strengthening the protection of the border with Ukraine on a rotational basis since March 2022 (for more details, see paragraph 1.3 of the review).

 

Other combat training activities

Other combat training activities include:

1) Combat readiness exercises were held in the Belarusian Armed Forces. Such exercises are held after the conscription for compulsory military service and mastering of the initial military training program by new recruits. The general orientation of the training is to conduct a set of exercises with the personnel on the recourse to martial law.

2) On June 10-12, drills with non-strategic nuclear forces took place (for more details, see paragraph 1.8 of the review).

3) On June 10-13, interdepartmental anti-terrorist drills “Storm-Antiterror-2024” were held on the territory of Brest region. The main objectives of the drills were to ensure the readiness of state bodies to respond to acts of terrorism, activities of terrorist organizations and illegal armed formations. Particular attention was paid to the organization of interdepartmental cooperation during the counter-terrorist operation.

4) On June 11, the battalion tactical group of the 6th Mechanized Brigade was brought to readiness to perform its assigned tasks as part of the combat readiness inspection of the Belarusian Armed Forces. During the inspection, the personnel with standard weapons moved to the Hozhski training ground to work out the issues of covering the state border. A combat training was conducted with the units.

 

Training of Belarusian military specialists in Russia

No information about training of Belarusian military specialists at training centers on the territory of Russia was received in June.

It is known that in August 2024, the personnel of one of the units of the 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade will perform combat launches at the Russian Ashuluk training ground. The Belarusian Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops hold annual drills at the Russian Ashuluk and Telemba training grounds, during which they perform combat launches.

 

Internal Troops, Border Guard bodies

Significant combat training activities include the following:

1) On June 16, regular combat training exercises were held with the Chest’ special forces detachment (the detachment consists of volunteers – members of the Chest’ Association of Veterans of the Special Operations Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). The exercises focused on engineering and tactical training. After the training, Commander of the Internal Troops Karpiankou met with the reservists. During the meeting, they discussed the prospects for the development of volunteer units of the Internal Troops, including technical equipment and armament of the Chest’ special forces detachment, additional training of specialists in narrow areas and other issues. Similar exercises were held on June 27.

2) On June 27, servicemen of the Tornado special forces detachment of the 2nd Militia Brigade of the Internal Troops took part in tactical specialty drills in Barysau. The readiness of government agencies to respond and cooperate in emergency situations was inspected on the territory of the Palace of Culture. The main focus was on practicing measures to ensure the safety of citizens and personnel.

 

Training of Belarusian enforcers by PMC Wagner mercenaries

Training of servicemen by PMC Wagner mercenaries continued in June. 

It is known that the mercenaries continue to work with servicemen of the Internal Troops systematically. However, this cooperation is not publicly recognized. Earlier we wrote that the press service of the Internal Troops stopped mentioning PMC Wagner in its publications. Since the beginning of February and up to the present time, the mercenaries have been publicly referred to as “experienced instructors.”

For this reason, the ongoing cooperation can be assessed by circumstantial evidence (mainly photos and videos). It is known, for example, that mercenaries completed combat coordination of the Tsiklon special forces detachment in June. The mercenaries also conducted a training course for other company and battalion commanders of military units of the Internal Troops.

Training of the Belarusian Armed Forces by the mercenaries was not reported.

1.2. Movements of military equipment and aviation activity

The main factors that influenced the intensity of movements of military equipment and aviation activity in June were: 1) Rehearsals for the parade dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Belarus (to be held in Minsk on July 3). 2) The sudden combat readiness inspection, which began on June 21 (for more details, see paragraph 1.1 of the review).

The intensity of movements of military equipment hasn’t changed compared to May.  As in previous months, there was nothing unusual in movements of the equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Most of the movements are concentrated in the vicinity of the areas where the garrisons and training grounds of the Belarusian Armed Forces are located. More details on the movements of military equipment are available on the map of military activity.

Movements of military equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces in June Movements of military equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces in June Belarusian Hajun

The intensity of movements of the Belarusian Armed Forces by rail decreased twofold compared to May. During the month, single movements of the Belarusian Armed Forces by rail were recorded. Trains with military equipment were recorded at Aziaryshcha, Orsha-Tsentralnaya, and Lakamatsiunaye Depo (Baranavichy) stations.

The intensity of flights of the Belarusian Air Force increased almost 1.5 times compared to May. Lida, Baranavichy and Machulishchy airfields were mainly used for flights, while Luninets, Ziabrauka and Babruisk airfields were used less frequently.

The following notable features of aviation activity can be noted:

1) During the month (on June 3, 14 and 26) flights of helicopters of the 50th Combined Air Base of the Belarusian Air Force continued to be recorded near the western border of Belarus. On June 30, a helicopter flight was recorded near the southern border.

2) On June 19, 16 aircrafts (Su-25 attack aircraft, Yak-130 and L-39 combat trainers) of the 116th Assault Air Base of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Lida airfield to Machulishchy airfield. The relocation of the aircraft is connected with preparations for participation in the parade, which will be held on July 3. 

3) On June 26, a Mi-8 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Volma (“Site 400. Kupol”). Then the helicopter flew to Ziabrauka airfield. And in the evening of the same day, it returned to Machulishchy airfield via “Site 400. Kupol.” A similar flight of the Mi-8 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force took place on June 27, only the destination was different: not Ziabrauka airfield, but Luninets airfield.

We recall that the command center of the group of the Russian Armed Forces, which started the invasion of Ukraine from Belarus in February 2022, was located on the territory of “Site 400. Kupol.”

Activity of the Belarusian Air Force in June Activity of the Belarusian Air Force in June Belarusian Hajun

1.3. Territorial defense and national home guard. Military commissariats

Territorial defense. National home guard

From June 4 to July 5, a training session with conscripts of the territorial troops of Partyzanski district of Minsk was held. The training session was aimed not only at training reservists in military specialties, but also at their participation in the military parade, which will take place on July 3 in Minsk. About 170 reservists were drafted from the reserve to the training session.

Command-staff drills were held on June 3-5 as part of the training session with conscripts of the territorial troops of Rechytsa district. During the command-staff drills, the main focus was on practicing martial law measures with the involvement of a national home guard detachment. On June 4, a one-day training session on territorial defense with chairmen of district executive committees of Homiel region was conducted in Rechytsa district as part of the drills. The participants of the training session learned organization of territorial defense on the administrative territory, the procedure of management of the territorial defense forces, repulsion of an attack by a sabotage and reconnaissance group, etc.

On June 11-12, a training on testing the resource provision by local authorities of the Lida District Department of Emergency Situations during wartime was held. The training was the fourth one held in different regions of Belarus. During the training, the issues of organizing the evacuation of the population, setting up a pontoon crossing were worked out, as well as the readiness of the emergency units to function in a special period was assessed. The participants of the training were also shown the organization of functioning of the collection center for temporarily evacuated residents. 

On June 25, a one-day training session on territorial defense was held on the basis of Pukhavichy district of Minsk region. Chairmen of district executive committees and representatives of military commissariats of Minsk region were invited to the training. The main topic of the event was the activity of the national home guard.

A training session with conscripts of the territorial troops was announced to be held in Vitsiebsk district in July. It is the tenth region of Belarus to hold drills with territorial defense since the beginning of the year. It is planned to draft 110 reservists to the training session.

Also, during the month, training sessions with commanders of the national home guard detachments and exercises with the Defense Councils were reported in Mahiliou region, and exercises with reserve officers of the territorial troops were reported in Brest region.

 

Military commissariats

In June, military commissariats across Belarus held combat readiness exercises. During the exercises, the deployment of the mobilization base and the sending of reservists to staff military units were practiced.

1.4. Military training sessions with reservists

Training sessions with reservists were reported in the following units in June:

  • The 557th Engineering Brigade (16 reservists);
  • The 120th Mechanized Brigade (40 reservists);
  • The 2nd Militia Brigade and the 3rd Special Forces Brigade of the Internal Troops (80 reservists);
  • The 36th Road and Bridge Brigade (25 reservists);
  • The 11th Mechanized Brigade (10 reservists);
  • The 110th Material Support Regiment (16 reservists);
  • The 16th Separate EW Regiment (3 reservists);
  • The 74th Signal Regiment (21 reservists);
  • Financial and Economic Department of the Northwestern Operational Command (5 reservists);
  • The 61st Fighter Air Base (15 reservists).

In total, at least 231 people were drafted to the training sessions in these units.

There was also information that military commissariats of Mahiliou region sent a total of 64 reservists to a military training session.

In June, a training session was held with the territorial troops in Partyzanski district of Minsk. In total, about 170 reservists were drafted to the training session.

The number of conscripts actually drafted from the reserve for military training sessions in 2024 The number of conscripts actually drafted from the reserve for military training sessions in 2024 Belarusian Hajun

Thus, the total number of reservists drafted to military training sessions in June can be at least 465 people. And in total since the beginning of 2024 – 9038 people. We note that this is the minimal number of reservists who have undergone military training sessions. In reality, their number may be several times higher, since open sources publish only fragmentary data on conscription to military training sessions. 

The Ministry of Defense of Belarus hasn’t reported the number of conscripts to be drafted to military training sessions in 2024. A total of 9000 people were planned to be drafted to training sessions in 2023.

1.5. Supplies of new weapons to the troops. Work of the military-industrial complex of Belarus

Supplies of new weapons to the troops

No supplies of new weapons to the troops were reported in June.

 

Announced plans for rearmament

The following rearmament plans were announced in June:

1) On June 5, during a visit to the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, Lukashenka was shown the assembly of Su-30SM2 fighters for the Belarusian army (a modernized version of the Su-30SM fighters). Previously, purchases of Su-30SM fighters for the army were repeatedly announced. Based on the latest public statements by officials of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, the Belarusian Armed Forces are to receive a certain number of Su-30SM in 2024. Later, supplies of Su-30SM2 will begin. One can expect that Belarusian pilots will receive the first Su-30SM2 in 2025-2026.

2) The Ministry of Defense of Belarus is planning new purchases of UAVs for the army. By the end of 2024, the Ministry is planning to purchase nine UAVs of the Autel Robotics company: four Autel EVO MAX 4T, four Autel EVO MAX 4N Standard Bundle and one Autel Dragonfish Standard. Most likely, the planned purchase of UAVs is an “installation batch” supplied for the initial stage of operation. This is indicated, among other things, by the small number of purchased equipment. 

3) The Belarusian Armed Forces may soon receive another batch of the Iskander-S missile systems (for more details, see paragraph 1.7 of the review).

 

Activity of the military-industrial complex

1) The State Authority for Military Industry successfully conducted a 400-kilometer march and live firing on the territory of a foreign customer with 9A33-2B combat vehicles from the Osa SAM system, modernized by the 2566th Radio-Electronic Weapons Repair Plant. Air targets were hit by each combat vehicle at the first attempt.

2) The State Authority for Military Industry continues testing the prototype of the Volat V-2 armored personnel carrier, developed in the interests of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. During the regular tests, the capabilities of the armored personnel carrier to overcome water obstacles were tested.

3) JSC ALEVKURP presented its development at the exhibition “National Security. Belarus-2024” – the Klyon short-range reconnaissance radar station. The station is designed to detect, recognize, measure coordinates and follow moving ground, surface and low-flying targets, as well as to aim at the selected target with firearms.

KB Radar demonstrated its new developments to combat UAVs at the exhibition. These include the modernized Groza-R2 radio-electronic gun for combating UAVs, the Dronoskop system (enables the disclosure of information on the coordinates and flight parameters of commercial DJI UAVs) and the Shapel UAV signal detector and direction finder.

Also, the LEMT Scientific and Technical Center of BelOMO demonstrated a prototype of the Phoenix laser mobile system for combating UAVs at the exhibition. The system includes a high-precision laser weapon with a power of 3 kW. It detects targets with the help of a locator, directs optics there, the operator selects the target and gives a command to destroy it. It is planned to “release a combat version” of the system on the market in 2025.

1.6. Development of military infrastructure. Formation of new units. Staffing of troops with personnel

According to satellite images, two storage facilities for military equipment are being built on the territory of the military town No. 2 “Paudniovy” in Asipovichy, where missile and artillery units of the Belarusian Armed Forces (the 51st Artillery Brigade, the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade and the 465th Missile Brigade) are deployed. The new facilities are very similar to the storage facility for Iskander-M systems, which was built on the territory of the military town in 2022-2023. 

The construction of new storage facilities indicates that Russia is planning to continue transferring Iskander-M missile systems to Belarus. In total, the Belarusian Armed Forces may receive a brigade set of Iskander-M (3 missile divisions, 4 self-propelled launchers in each). 

The published images also show the reconstruction of two administrative buildings, as well as the laying of foundations for new constructions of unknown purpose. The construction of these facilities is probably also related to the deployment of Iskander systems.

 

Formation of new units.

On June 18, the opening ceremony of the Vitsiaz special forces detachment took place in Vitsiebsk. Officially, the unit’s tasks are to conduct combat operations, fight sabotage and reconnaissance groups and illegal armed groups, as well as to strengthen the protection of the state border. The unit is part of the 7th militia brigade of the Internal Troops (military unit 5524), and will be deployed in Vitsiebsk and Polatsk.

The Vitsiaz special forces detachment became the thirteenth such unit in the Internal Troops structure. The unit is armed with the Volat V1 armored vehicles, the Groza-Z1 UAV protection system, anti-tank missile systems, pickup trucks, ATVs, UAVs of various types, 82-mm mortars, AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, SPG-9 anti-tank grenade launchers, etc. 

1.7. Tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus

The drills with Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces became one of the main events of June.

On June 10, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus reported that in accordance with the decision of Lukashenka and Putin, units of the Belarusian Armed Forces were taking part in the second stage of drills with non-strategic nuclear forces. In his commentary, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin said, “Today we are acting proactively, increasing readiness for the use of so-called retaliatory weapons in a planned manner. As never before, we are determined to respond to any threats posed both to our country and the Union State.”

On June 12, Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces Pavel Muraveika said that as part of the drills, the crews of Iskander-M missile systems moved to the assigned position areas. According to Muraveika, the crews “received special munitions and assigned them to combat units,” after which they took up launch positions and went on combat duty at assigned targets. In other words, during the drills, they used non-training munitions.

However, this information was denied by the Russian Defense Ministry the next day. On June 13, Igor Kolesnikov, the chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, said that during the drills, the directorate’s mobile formations ensured “the delivery of training nuclear munitions to the field storage facilities of the missile brigade’s positioning area and the assault aviation’s operational airfield.”

Su-25 attack aircraft also took part in the drills. It was noted that until the last moment, the commanders of the aviation units didn’t know who exactly would be practicing combat training tasks and from which airfield the aircraft would operate. All actions during the drills were practiced jointly with the Russian military. In total, two Su-25 attack aircraft of the Belarusian Air Force, one Su-30SM fighter of the Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as the crew of the Iskander-M missile system could be involved in the drills. The tasks were practiced at the Damanava and Obuz-Liasnouski training grounds.

The statements of representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus and the Ministry of Defense of Russia contained contradictory information regarding the use of training ammunition. It is possible that this presentation of information occurred by prior agreement between the parties and was part of the PSYOP. Its purpose, for example, could be to mislead about the presence (or absence) of TNWs in Belarus. Also, the contradictory statements can create a ground for the emergence of a large number of conspiracy theories, which are very difficult to verify in practice

For more details about the drills, see the document dated June 17, “The Belarusian military took part in the second stage of drills with Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces.”

As we have repeatedly previously noted, currently there is still no reliable data that would confirm the deployment of TNWs on the territory of Belarus.

1.8. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere

1) On June 18, a meeting of the Security Council was held. At the meeting, the draft decree on the assessment of the state of national security was considered. The need to develop the document arose due to the adoption of a new National Security Concept in April 2024. The draft document defines the main indicators and criteria for assessing the state of national security in nine areas. Special attention is paid to the issues of biological security. 

As a result of the meeting of the Security Council, the draft decree was approved. Before adoption, it will be adjusted taking into account the discussions. The document under development is secret and won’t be published.

2) According to the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of June 19, No. 434, the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation and Navy (DOSAAF) was allocated additional funds to “ensure mobilization training and mobilization.” In particular, the society received about $1.2 million for the purchase of aviation equipment.

3) On June 27, a decree was signed, which approved new models of military uniforms for servicemen. The new uniform elements included tactical shirts, fleece jackets and helmets for combat uniforms.

1.9. International military cooperation

June was full of events in the sphere of international military cooperation. For example, during the month, the leadership of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces visited China. A group of students from the National Defense University of Zimbabwe visited Belarus.

A new Syrian Military Attache was accredited in Belarus. Officials of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus held a meeting with representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Saudi Arabia.

On the CSTO side, the second headquarters negotiations on the organization and conduct of drills were held in Kyrgyzstan. On the CIS side, a meeting of the Coordination Committee of Chiefs of Engineering Troops was held.

Other events of international cooperation included:

1) Representatives of Serbia visited the 38th Air Assault Brigade for an assessment within the framework of the Vienna Document 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures. During the visit, the consistency of the information on the brigade provided annually by Belarus with the current status and activities of the unit was verified. A report on the results of the verification will be sent to all OSCE member states. 

This was the first verification event on the territory of Belarus in the last four years.

2) On June 26, a meeting of the Joint Council of the Transport Troops of Belarus and the Railway Troops of Russia was held at the 30th Railway Brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces. During the meeting, the results of joint cooperation in 2024 were summarized, and topical issues of further activities were discussed.

Chapter 2. Russia’s military activity in Belarus

2.1. Russian group in Belarus

The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus didn’t change in June compared to previous months.

Russian military continue to be stationed at Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields. According to available information, one anti-aircraft missile divizion of the 1530th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces (military unit 31458) is stationed at each of the airfields. The regiment is part of the Eastern Military District and was redeployed to Belarus to take part in the Union Resolve-2022 drills back in early February 2022.

The presence of the Russian military at Ziabrauka airfield is confirmed by regular movements of vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces in Mazyr and its vicinity. So far, it hasn’t been publicly reported in what status the Russian military are present at the airfields.  

In June, parade teams (up to 500 people), and equipment of the Russian Armed Forces (up to 20 artillery systems) arrived in Belarus to participate in the military parade to be held on July 3 (for more details, see paragraph 2.1 of the review). These units can be expected to return to Russia after the parade.

Thus, as of July 1, 2024, the number of Russian military personnel stationed in Belarus increased and can be estimated at about 2500 people. Of these:

  • at Baranavichy, Machulishchy airfields, and in Minsk city – up to 500 people (participants of the military parade);
  • Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields – 500-600 people; 
  • at the 474th Baranavichy separate radio-technical node (70M6 Volga radar station, military unit 03522) and ​​Russian Navy’s 43rd Vileika communication center (military unit 49390)  – up to 1450 people.

Also, the following Russian military law enforcement agencies continue to work in Belarus: the 484th Military Investigation Department (Kletsk district, Minsk region) and the 313th Military Prosecutor’s Office of the garrison (Minsk). The number of personnel involved in these structures could be estimated at dozens of people.

It should be noted that on the night of June 21-22, Russia launched another missile strike against the territory of Ukraine. Ukrainian monitoring resources reported that a number of missiles may have flown over the territory of Belarus. In particular, two groups of Russian missiles flew over Brahin district of Homiel region, near Kamaryn town. Flights of Russian missiles over Homiel region were also recorded in April 2024.

The flight restriction zone for all types of civil aircraft (including UAVs) at altitudes from 0 to 19,800 meters in southern Belarus was extended according to NOTAMN O0380/24 from 00:00 on July 1 to 23:59 on September 30, 2024. The ban on flights over the southern part of Belarus was introduced on February 24, 2022, with the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It was from the south of Belarus that missile strikes were launched against Ukrainian territory. Thus, the potential threat of missile attacks on the territory of Ukraine from the airspace of Belarus remains at least until the end of September 2024.

2.2. Movements of military equipment and aviation activity

The intensity of movements of military equipment by public roads didn’t change compared to May. Regular movements of equipment of the Russian Armed Forces have been recorded mostly in Mazyr and Homiel districts, where the Russian Armed Forces are permanently deployed. More details on the movements of military equipment are available on the map.

For the first time in a long time, movements of the Russian Armed Forces by rail were recorded. For example, on June 8, a group of servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces and 10 T-34 tanks arrived in Belarus as part of a military cargo train to take part in the military parade to be held on July 3. On June 13, it was reported that another military cargo train with military equipment of the Russian Armed Forces arrived in Belarus to participate in the parade.

In June, the aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces slightly increased compared to May. This was primarily connected with preparations for the military parade to be held in Minsk on July 3.

Activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces in June Activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces in June Belarusian Hajun

Transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces and Russia’s FSB kept arriving at the airfields of the Belarusian Armed Forces and civilian airports. Most of them are not directly connected with military activity in Belarus:

  • Machulishchy airfield: passenger aircraft – 1 Il-18D (was used to fly over the border of the so-called “Union State”), 1 An-148; transport aircraft – 1 Il-76 (brought a parade team of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces to participate in the military parade on July 3), 1 Il-76.
  • Baranavichy airfield: transport aircraft – 1 An-26, 1 An-124 (probably, the aircraft arrived to take cargo at the 558th Aircraft Repair Plant), 1 An-12, 1 Il-76.
  • Mahiliou airport, Minsk National Airport: transport aircraft – 2 Il-76 of the Russian Aerospace Forces (arrivals are not related to military activity, but to the meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, which took place on June 3-4).
  • Brest airport: passenger aircraft – 1 Tu-154 of the Russian FSB (the aircraft brought a delegation of the Russian FSB to participate in the commemorative events dedicated to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War).
  • Homiel airport: transport aircraft – 1 An-12.

The number of aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces that arrived in Belarus The number of aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces that arrived in Belarus Belarusian Hajun

The following features of aviation activity can be noted:

1) On June 4, an An-26 military transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived at Baranavichy airfield from Russia. On June 6 and 7, the aircraft made flights in the airspace of Belarus. On June 10, the aircraft flew back to Russia.

2) On June 29, an An-12 military transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived at Homiel airport from Russia. It is possible that the arrival of the aircraft may be related to another rotation of the Russian contingent stationed at Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields. Previously, we recorded the rotation of the Russian military in December 2023 and March 2024.

3) During the month (on June 11, 12, 15, 18 and 22), flights of Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces were recorded.

4) In May-June, the Belarusian Rada Airlines cargo airline twice flew Il-62 passenger aircraft from Orsha to the capital of Mali, Bamako. It is known that the rest of the mercenaries of PMC Wagner are deployed in Mali. It should also be noted that in October-November 2023, a possible transportation of the mercenaries from Belarus to Mali by aircraft of the Russian AbakanAir airline was recorded.

During the month, the following changes in the composition of the aviation group of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Belarus were noted:

1) On June 21, 11 helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces (5 Mi-28, 5 Ka-52 and 1 Mi-26) of the 344th center for combat training and retraining of flight personnel of the Russian Defense Ministry arrived at Machulishchy airfield from Torzhok airfield (Russia). The arrival of helicopters was connected with participation in the parade, which will take place on July 3.

2) On June 24, two Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces flew from Baranavichy airfield to Shatalovo airfield (Russia). The aircraft had been permanently stationed in Belarus since January 2023 and took part in joint Air Force drills of Belarus and Russia (in January 2023 and May 2024). 

3) On June 25, 11 MiG-29 and Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived at Baranavichy airfield from Kubinka airfield (Russia). The aircraft are part of the “Russian Vityazi” and “Strizhi” aerobatic groups of the Russian Aerospace Forces and will take part in the military parade on July 3.

Thus, as of July 1, the following aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently stationed on the territory of Belarus:

  • at Lida airfield – one Su-25 attack aircraft;
  • at Baranavichy airfield – 15 fighters (5 MiG-29 and 10 Su-30SM); 
  • at Machulishchy airfield – 11 helicopters (5 Mi-28, 5 Ka-52, and 1 Mi-26).

Thus, there are a total of 16 aircraft and 11 helicopters. Of these, only 4 Su-30SM fighters and 1 Su-25 attack aircraft are permanently stationed in Belarus. The rest of the aircraft, as well as all the helicopters have arrived in Belarus to participate in the military parade, which will be held on July 3. There is no doubt that after the parade is over, the aircraft will return to the airfields in Russia.

General conclusions

1) The main event of June for the Belarusian Armed Forces was the beginning of the sudden combat readiness inspection and the subsequent escalation of the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border. The situation continues to develop, and there are no signs that it will end soon. At the same time, the inspection itself has all the signs of being a planned PSYOP.

The most threatening situation is the use of the allegedly growing military threat from Ukraine as a reason to redeploy the Russian military contingent to Belarus. It is unlikely that it will be a large force. However, the very fact of the deployment of the Russian contingent will have a negative impact on the military situation in Belarus.

Participation in the drills with non-strategic nuclear forces doesn’t suggest that TNWs are deployed in Belarus. Moreover, elements of PSYOP were also present in the conduct and coverage of these drills.

The process of rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces continues. The main event of June was the information about the preparation of infrastructure to deploy the new Iskander-M systems. As it was supposed earlier, Belarus will be able to receive a brigade set (3 divizions) of the Iskander-M systems.

The general direction of the national security activities implemented by the Lukashenka regime indicates an increasing (in the regime’s opinion) probability of Belarus’ participation in the war.

2) The general conclusion about the situation with the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Belarus didn’t change. All the conclusions given in the review for February remain valid. There was a slight increase in the number of the Russian group in Belarus due to participation in the military parade on July 3.

Information about the upcoming deployment of Russian troops to Belarus by rail hasn’t been confirmed yet. However, given the escalation of the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border, the deployment of the Russian military contingent in Belarus to protect the “Union State” can’t be ruled out.

 The level of activity of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus in June can be described as low.

3) All the conclusions regarding the prospects for the deployment of PMC Wagner mercenaries in Belarus given in the review for October 2023 remain valid. A small number of the mercenaries (up to 100 people) are still stationed in Belarus, who serve as instructors for Belarusian military structures. There are no signs of a complete shutdown of mercenaries’ activities in Belarus.

The level of activity of PMC Wagner in Belarus in April can be described as very low.