Information in the review is provided as of January 8, 2025
Summary
There were practically no notable combat training events in December. Among the most notable events were: 1) combat training exercises; 2) training of military drivers from among recruits drafted for military service. These events are cyclical and are held twice a year in the Belarusian Armed Forces.
The situation on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border changed. After a two-month break, mechanized units of the Ground Forces returned to the border area with Ukraine to strengthen border protection. In total, up to 1,500 servicemen were redeployed to Stolin, Lelchytsy, Mazyr, and Homiel districts. The established group does not pose a military threat to Ukraine.
The month was full of events related to rearmament. Supplies of UAVs and EW systems continued. For the first time in a long time, units of the Engineering Troops received equipment modernized in Russia. In addition, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus plans to purchase new equipment for logistics units.
Russian UAVs continued to fly into Belarus’ airspace. A total of 145 UAVs (mostly of the Shahed type) were recorded in December. There are still no grounds to claim that the situation will be radically resolved in the coming months. This is also indicated by another extension of the flight restriction zone in the south of Belarus.
The general direction of the national security measures implemented by the Lukashenka regime indicates an increasing (in the regime’s opinion) probability of Belarus’ participation in the war. At the same time, the participation of the Belarusian Armed Forces in military actions on the side of Russia still looks unlikely.
The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus in December did not change fundamentally compared to previous months. As of January 1, 2025, the number of the Russian military in Belarus can be estimated at ≈ 2000 people. At least 2 Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently deployed at Baranavichy airfield.
The most notable events of the month were information about preparations for the construction of a Russian military facility on the territory of the 1405th artillery ammunition base (military unit 42707). There are no other details about the construction of the facility yet. The future facility should be considered in the context of the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State signed in December, under which Russia can establish additional military bases and deploy military contingents on the territory of Belarus.
No increase in the number of the Russian group in Belarus has been recorded. The main factor that can significantly change the situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus is the West-2025 drills.
1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
1.1. Combat training
As the first month of the 2024/2025 academic year, December was practically unremarkable in terms of significant combat training events. In addition, no sudden combat readiness inspections were reported. Although earlier (in December 2022 and 2023) such inspections were always conducted.
Among the most notable events were: 1) combat readiness training; 2) training of military drivers among new recruits drafted for military service.
On December 2, a new academic year declared “the year of military proficiency” began in the Belarusian Armed Forces. Traditionally, at the beginning of the new academic year, units of the Belarusian Armed Forces hold scheduled combat readiness exercises. Such exercises are held after the regular conscription and mastering of the initial military training program by new recruits. The purpose of the exercises is to check the ability of servicemen to perform coordinated actions when bringing units to the highest levels of combat readiness. During the training, the actions of the personnel were practiced upon getting up on alarm; receiving materiel, weapons and ammunition; guarding and defense of facilities, etc.
Traditionally, the training of new military drivers was completed in December. It ended with 50-kilometer marches. The servicemen practiced driving skills as part of a convoy of vehicles, as well as actions in various conditions. It should be noted that a significant part of the new recruits drafted to serve in the Belarusian Armed Forces are assigned to the positions of drivers.
Separately, the following activities can be mentioned:
1) Coordination of units of one of the mechanized battalions of the 11th Mechanized Brigade, which was conducted at the Obuz-Liasnouski training ground. It is likely that after the combat coordination was completed, the battalion was redeployed to the border area with Ukraine (for more details, see p.3 of the review).
2) A training session with UAV operators was held at the 38th Air Assault Brigade. Participants practiced conducting aerial reconnaissance and adjusting artillery strikes. Special attention was paid to the operation of UAVs in conditions of electronic interference.
3) In December, it was reported that tactical exercises were conducted with a unit of the 11th Mechanized Brigade at the “resistance node” of the Kobryn fortified area (located in Zhabinka district). During the training, they practiced clearing trenches and communication routes. Drills at the “resistance node” are regularly conducted with units of the Western Operational Command. Their purpose is to train soldiers to conduct maneuverable defense with reliance on pre-prepared fortifications.
4) Instructors of the TAKMED Special Forces Center (Russia) held two-day courses on tactical medicine in Maladzechna district. The courses were attended, among others, by servicemen of the 22nd Separate Special Forces Company of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
1.2. Movements of military equipment. Aviation activity
The intensity of recorded movements of military equipment remained at the same level compared to November. This is due to the fact that practically no combat training activities were conducted in December (for more details, see p.1.1 of the review).
There was nothing abnormal in movements of the equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Most of the movements were concentrated in the vicinity of large garrisons (Minsk, Barysau). More details on the movements of military equipment can be found on the map of military activity.
No movements of the Belarusian Armed Forces by rail were recorded.
The intensity of flights of the Belarusian Air Force decreased by almost 50% compared to November. The decrease was primarily due to unfavorable weather conditions. During the month, 117 flight activity events were recorded.
A “flight activity event” means the takeoff or landing of an aircraft or helicopter at an active airfield (airport) or landing sites located on terrain (including inactive airfields).
The following notable features of aviation activity can be mentioned:
1) On December 5, 12-13, 20-22, flights of fighters of the Belarusian Air Force from Baranavichy airfield were recorded in the southern and southeastern regions of Belarus. Part of these flights were related to interceptions of Russian UAVs (for more details, see p.4 of the review).
2) On December 10-13, 2 Mi-8 helicopters of the Belarusian Air Force arrived at Luninets airfield from Machulishchy airfield.
1.3. Military commissariats
As in the Belarusian Armed Forces in general, there was no noticeable activity of military commissariats in December. For example, it was reported that combat and mobilization readiness exercises were held, during which their transition from peacetime to wartime was practiced. The exercises included trainings with the administrations of centers for preliminary collection of conscripts and equipment, reception of conscripts drafted from the reserve and receipt of materiel, and guarding of military commissariats.
During the month, no court verdicts were reported in criminal cases on evasion of conscription for compulsory military service (p. 1 of Art.435 of the Criminal Code).
The scope of one of the tasks that military commissariats performed in 2024 – conscription of reserve officers – became known. For instance, a plan to conscript 1,000 reserve officers was set for 2024. Recall that in late April 2024, Decree No. 179 “On conscription of reserve officers for military service” was published. The document stipulated that in 2024, reserve officers who had graduated from the military department and had not completed compulsory military service would be drafted to serve in the Belarusian Armed Forces and the Border Guard Service. The peculiarity of the document was that the number of drafted officers was classified. It was not reported whether the military commissariats managed to draft the required number of reserve officers.
2025 will be a busy year for military commissariats with various activities. According to the military commissariat of Smaliavichy district and Zhodzina, in the 2024/2025 academic year “the intensity of mobilization training activities will increase many times.” Namely, the number of training sessions will increase. In addition, a lot of activities are planned: inspection of military registration, verification of data of all citizens, who are to be drafted under mobilization, by private communication.
1.4. Territorial defense
No training sessions with the territorial troops were held in December. However, it became known that in April-May 2025, a training session will be held in Smaliavichy district and Zhodzina. As part of the training session, conscripts will be trained and will participate in the military parade, which will be held on May 9 in Minsk. 150 people will be drafted from the reserve for the training session.
The most notable events were:
1) Advanced training courses “Fundamentals of military security and territorial defense” were held at the Faculty of the General Staff with the chairmen of district (city) executive committees. The training is aimed at improving the level of preparation and coordination of territorial defense management bodies for the formation of territorial troops.
2) A three-day sniper training session for hunters was held at the Valoushchyna training center of the Internal Troops. During the training session, 15 representatives of the Belarusian Hunters and Fishermen Society under the guidance of instructors of the Special Rapid Response Unit and the Almaz anti-terrorism unit studied “the subtleties of the Mosin rifle.” The main emphasis was on practice with daily shooting in various tactical situations, including in conditions of limited visibility. Participants of the training session also studied the basics of military topography, practiced first aid and camouflage.
1.5. Training of the mobilization reserve
No training sessions with conscripts were reported in December.
The decrease in the intensity of military training sessions was primarily connected with the end of the academic year in the troops and holiday season. At the same time, the intensification of activities on the training of the mobilization reserve can be expected already at the beginning of 2025.
A total of about 15 thousand people were drafted for military training sessions in 2024. This was announced by the head of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Department of the General Staff at the end of November. According to data from open sources, from January to December 2024, about 12,382 people were drafted to various types of military training sessions in the Belarusian Armed Forces, Internal Troops and border guard bodies.
1.6. Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Work of the military-industrial complex
Rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces
The most notable event was the supply of a batch of equipment modernized at the Russian military-industrial complex enterprises to the Engineering Troops. The equipment included modernized PTS-2 floating transporters, IMR-2 engineering vehicles, and bridge-laying vehicles. The quantity of modernized equipment was not specified.
In December, supplies of EW equipment continued. The 48th Separate EW Battalion held a “ceremony of receiving another batch of new equipment.” Judging by the published photos, the battalion could receive at least two R-934UM2 Groza-6 automated jamming stations. Back in late November, the State Authority for Military Industry delivered two R-934UM2 jamming stations to the Belarusian Armed Forces. And “in the near future,” the Belarusian Armed Forces are to receive two more Groza-6 stations. Thus, the following could take place in the 48th Battalion: 1) the ceremony of delivering the R-934UM2 stations supplied to the Belarusian Armed Forces in late November; 2) the ceremony of delivering the new batch of the R-934UM2 stations to the crews, which the State Authority for Military Industry promised to deliver “in the near future.” A total of 15 new wearable EW devices were developed and adopted in 2024, “for an ordinary soldier in a trench to detect and suppress UAVs.”
Supplies of UAVs to the troops continued. In late November, it became known that the 927th center for training and application of UAVs began operating the Belarusian-made Berkut-3 reconnaissance UAV. Back in April 2024, it was reported that the Ministry of Defense of Belarus planned to purchase 10 sets of the Berkut-3 UAV. However, in May, the ministry started the procurement procedure for only one Berkut-3. Probably the first (and so far the only one in the Belarusian Armed Forces) Berkut-3. Also, in early December, the chief of staff of the 120th Mechanized Brigade said that “over the past few months” the brigade had received “a large number” of multi-rotor UAVs.
Planned purchases of equipment
In December, it became known about the plans of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus to purchase a batch of fuel tankers. The military will receive the following vehicles: 1) ATZ-6 – 21 pcs.; 2) ATZ-12 – 3 pcs. The numbers “6” and “12” in the name mean the volume of petroleum products (cubic meters), which can be transported by the tanker. It should be noted that currently the fleet of fuel tankers of the Belarusian Armed Forces is mainly represented by Soviet-made vehicles.
Work of the military-industrial complex
Belarusian specialists are mastering the repair of Russian-made military equipment. In early December, a contract was signed between the 2566th Radio-Electronic Weapons Repair Plant and the Russian Almaz-Antey Aerospace Defense Concern for the training of specialists in the program “Maintenance and repair of the 98Zh6 SAM system (S-400 Triumf). The training will allow Belarusian specialists to perform maintenance and repair of “key components” of the S-400 system. Officials of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus have repeatedly noted that Russia has transferred a regiment set of the S-400 SAM system (two anti-aircraft missile divizions) to Belarus.
Tests of new Belarusian-made weapons continued. On December 10, the 9M318 anti-aircraft guided missile for the Buk-MB2 SAM system was tested at the Palesski site. The 9M318 missile is designed to destroy high-speed maneuvering aerodynamic targets (UAVs), missiles of various types, helicopters and above-water targets. On December 14, firing tests of the Sapfir grenade launcher system took place at the Barysauski training ground. The tests became the next stage in the adoption of the grenade launcher for the Belarusian Armed Forces. It was also reported about the completion of development work on the creation of the Sapsan mobile system for countering small UAVs. The system is designed to protect critical facilities from UAVs, search for, detect, escort, electronically suppress and destroy them.
Plans on military developments in the field of artificial intelligence were announced. According to the deputy head of the General Staff for Scientific Work, the Belarusian military talked about developments in the field of artificial intelligence. According to the official, work is underway to “introduce [artificial intelligence] directly into the models of weapons and equipment.” It was not specified what kind of weapons and equipment.
1.7. Tactical nuclear weapons
No new information related to TNWs in Belarus was received in December. However, officials and politicians continue to report details of the transfer and use of nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus.
For example, on December 6, responding to a question about the procedure for the use of nuclear weapons in the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State, State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus Aliaksandr Valfovich said the following: “Each president [Putin and Lukashenka] has his own ‘red button,’ his own briefcase, his own nuclear suitcase. Only [Lukashenka] has the right to use the weapons that are on the territory of Belarus. And only the president of Russia has the right to use the weapons that are on the territory of Russia and give a command to do so.”
And on December 10, Aliaksandr Lukashenka said, “I have brought nuclear warheads [to Belarus]. More than a dozen of them. Many people write: ‘Ah, it’s a joke, nobody brought anything.’ We did. And the fact that they [opponents] say it’s a joke means that they missed it. They didn’t even notice how we brought them here.”
As we have repeatedly previously noted, currently there is still no reliable data that would confirm the deployment of TNWs on the territory of Belarus.
1.8. Development of military infrastructure
The infrastructure of military towns continues to develop. In early December, the Liadzishcha military town opened in Barysau after renovation. An artillery group of the 120th Mechanized Brigade is stationed there. The headquarters, two barracks and other facilities were renovated. Among other things, a training class for FPV drone operators was created. According to Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin, about 400 facilities in the Belarusian Armed Forces are under construction, repair or modernization. Planned works have already been completed at more than 250 facilities.
Apparently, the Belarusian authorities plan to continue building fortifications. For instance, at the end of November, a Belarusian delegation visited Pochep (a district center in Bryansk region). It consisted of the chairmen of the Brest and Homel Regional Executive Committees, as well as representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus and the General Staff. During the visit, Belarusian officials and military studied the procedure of erection and maintenance of defensive structures, the cost of construction, the procedure of organization of works and other issues. The construction of the fortified areas, unofficially named “Khrenin’s line” (after the Belarusian Defense Minister), began in Belarus in 2023.
Infrastructure for the training of military specialists was developed. For example, the 19th Mechanized Brigade opened a classroom for training operators of the Igla portable anti-aircraft missile systems equipped with a modern simulator complex. A specialized class for the training of UAV operators opened at the military faculty of Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics. By September 1, 2025, it is planned to open 16 more such classes in universities with military faculties or departments. On September 12, the training of students in these classes will begin.
1.9. Oreshnik missile system
On December 6, during a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State, Aliaksandr Lukashenka asked Vladimir Putin to deploy the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus. In response, Putin said that the deployment of Oreshnik in Belarus “will become possible, I think, in the second half [of 2025]: as the serial production of such systems in Russia increases and as the system is put into service with Russian troops of strategic importance.”
At the end of December, Lukashenka said that he was counting on the delivery of at least ten Oreshnik missile systems to Belarus. No other details about the deployment of the missile system in Belarus have been reported yet.
1.10. Amendments to legislation
On December 6, during a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the “Union State,” Belarus and Russia signed the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the “Union State.” The document defines mutual allied obligations to ensure defense, protection of sovereignty, independence and constitutional order of Russia and Belarus, the integrity and inviolability of the territories and the external border of the “Union State.” And with the use of all available forces and means (including nuclear weapons). A new Security Concept of the “Union State” was approved during the meeting.
The texts of the signed documents have not been published yet. However, BELPOL disclosed the content of the agreement signed on December 6. The Treaty consists of 9 articles. It says that in case of “a threat to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, the external border of the Union State, the constitutional order of Belarus and Russia from third states, their associations, terrorist and extremist organizations and groups,” the parties to the treaty should immediately provide each other with military, military-technical and other assistance and use their available “forces and means.” The treaty also allows Russia to establish additional military bases and deploy military contingents on the territory of Belarus “to repel external aggression.”
The Treaty also mentions the use of Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus (the fact of their deployment has not yet been confirmed). The conditions for the use of nuclear weapons in the Treaty correspond to the provisions of the Russian Nuclear Doctrine.
Another milestone event was the approval of the Defense Plan of Belarus for 2026-2030 on December 13. The document presents five main strategic directions: 1) reducing the level of military danger and preventing military conflicts (actions to be taken in the political, economic, information and military spheres to ensure this); 2) preparing the state for defense, covering all spheres, from the economy to the military sphere; 3) options for the armed defense of the country in various modern conflicts; 4) preparing the economy of the state and the state as a whole to function under conditions of military operations; 5) maintaining international peace and security and elimination of various phenomena that may affect the security of our country.
2. Internal Troops
Changes in organizational and staffing structure
In December, it became known about the formation of new special forces units. For example, a special forces platoon was formed in the 1st company of the 1st patrol battalion of the 1st Militia Brigade (military unit 5448). The platoon carries out patrol and checkpoint service, and participates in carrying out “special complex activities.” There are plans to form separate special forces platoons in the 4th Patrol Battalion, as well as in the 5th Rifle Battalion of the brigade. In addition, a sniper group has been formed in the Granit special forces detachment, military unit 5448.
Personnel training
In December, junior officer training courses were held at the Valoushchyna training center. The training was conducted by servicemen of the special units of the Internal Troops “under the guidance of experienced instructors” and “with an emphasis on combat experience.” In total, more than 70 servicemen from the Special Rapid Reaction Unit and special forces detachments attended the course. As a result of the training, they were awarded the first officer ranks of junior lieutenant/lieutenant.
Work with “volunteers”
In December, active work with the so-called “volunteer units” continued. These units consist of former employees and servicemen of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Internal Troops who are in reserve.
The Chest’ special forces detachment was the most active. They are regularly trained in firearms, tactical, medical and engineering training, as well as UAV control. Trainings were also held on the topic “Fundamentals of the commander’s work in preparing for and during combat.” The trainings are conducted by both instructors of the Internal Troops and former mercenaries of PMC Wagner. In addition, specialists of the Belarusian Red Cross Society were involved in tactical medicine training.
It is notable that a women’s group was formed within the Chest’ special forces detachment. It was noted that most of its members were wives of active servicemen and veterans of the special forces units of the Internal Troops. The number of women who joined the Chest’ special forces detachment was not disclosed.
The formation of new units of “volunteers” was reported. For example, a “volunteer” unit was formed on the basis of the 1st Militia Brigade from reserve soldiers who were assigned to the brigade. Trainings will be organized for combat coordination of the “volunteers.”
It also became known that another training session with “volunteer” units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is scheduled for January. The start time of the training session is notable – January 21 (Tuesday). After all, the so-called “presidential election” is to be held in Belarus on January 26 (Sunday). Probably, it was decided to mobilize all available reserves to help the law enforcers during the “election.”
3. Group deployed in the border regions. Situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border
In December, the situation with the group deployed in Homiel region changed. After the withdrawal of mechanized units of the Belarusian Armed Forces to their permanent deployment points (which took place in late September-early October), they were again redeployed to the border area with Ukraine in December.
At the end of December, the chairman of Hrodna Regional Executive Committee and the commander of the Western Operational Command of the Belarusian Armed Forces “congratulated the servicemen who perform tasks to strengthen the state border of Belarus.” On December 29, a similar event was held by the chairmen of Homiel Regional Executive Committee and Mazyr District Executive Committee, as well as the commander of the Northwestern Operational Command. The above-mentioned events indicate the redeployment of units of the Ground Forces to the area bordering Ukraine.
According to available information, the following units were redeployed to the Ukrainian border area:
— The 11th Mechanized Brigade (military unit 33933, Slonim): the separate mechanized battalion, the 841st Artillery Group (some units), the reconnaissance battalion (some units), the anti-aircraft missile-artillery divizion (some units). The brigade’s units are stationed in Stolin district (Brest region) and Lelchytsy district (Homiel region).
— The 147th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (military unit 96869, Babruisk): a battery of the Osa-AKM SAM system (location unknown).
— The 120th Mechanized Brigade (military unit 04147, Minsk): the 358th Separate Mechanized Battalion, the 310th Artillery Group (some units), the reconnaissance battalion (some units), the anti-aircraft missile-artillery divizion (some units). The brigade’s units are stationed in the vicinity of Ziabrauka (Homiel district) and Mazyr (Bokau) (Mazyr district) airfields.
The exact time of redeployment of units of the Belarusian Armed Forces is unknown. It probably took place in the second half of December 2024. The number of servicemen of the Ground Forces, redeployed to the border with Ukraine in December, can be estimated at about 1,000-1,500 people.
Some units of the Internal Troops also continue to carry out tasks in the border area with Ukraine. During the month, it was reported that servicemen of the Internal Troops “continue to ensure the security of the sacred borders of the Fatherland.” The exact number of servicemen of the Internal Troops deployed in the border area with Ukraine is unknown.
It is notable that representatives of the Lukashenka regime did not comment on the strengthening of their military presence in the south of Belarus. It can be expected that units of the 11th and 120th Mechanized Brigades will stay in the border area with Ukraine until at least mid-February. Thereafter, the rotation of these units can be expected.
Units of the Belarusian Armed Forces and Internal Troops deployed in the southern regions of Belarus do not pose a military threat to Ukraine.
4. Flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus’ airspace
In December, Russian UAVs of the Shahed type continued to fly into the airspace of Belarus. It should be noted that UAVs were initially launched from the territory of Russia to attack Ukraine and to conduct reconnaissance.
During the month (December 1-6, 8, 12-14, 16-23, 25 and 31), 145 Russian UAVs were recorded flying into Belarus’ airspace. Of the 145 UAVs:
- 36 subsequently flew to Ukraine or Russia;
- 109 “disappeared” – there is no information about their further fate.
A total of 395 UAVs (mostly of the Shahed type) were recorded flying into Belarus’ airspace from July to December 2024. There were 10 confirmed cases of UAVs being shot down/crashing on the territory of Belarus and Latvia.
There was no new information regarding the reasons for the flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus. Two versions remain the most probable: 1) Changed tactics of using UAVs by the Russian military. During missile attacks, Russian UAVs fly into the territory of Belarus (where they can’t be shot down by Ukrainian air defense units) to subsequently fly to the territory of Ukraine. Such actions may, for example, prolong the duration of missile attacks. 2) Due to the work of Ukrainian EW systems (e.g., the Pokrova GPS spoofing system).
As of today, there is no reason to believe that flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus may stop anytime soon. This is also indicated by another extension of the flight restriction zone for all types of civil aircraft (including UAVs) in the south of Belarus.
5. Russia’s military activity in Belarus
5.1. Russian group in Belarus
The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus didn’t change significantly in December compared to previous months.
Russian military continue to be stationed at Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields. According to available information, one anti-aircraft missile divizion of the 1530th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces (military unit 31458) is stationed at each of the airfields. The regiment is part of the Eastern Military District and was redeployed to Belarus to take part in the Union Resolve-2022 drills back in early February 2022.
The presence of the Russian military at MAzyr (Bokau) airfield is confirmed by regular movements of vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces in Mazyr and its vicinity. So far, it hasn’t been publicly reported in what status the Russian military are present at the airfields. At the same time, in March 2022, Lukashenka said that he had asked the Russian president to leave “some forces to cover the Homiel direction.”
As of January 1, 2025, the number of Russian military personnel stationed in Belarus can be estimated at about 2000 people. Of these:
- the 474th Baranavichy separate radio-technical node (70M6 Volga radar station, military unit 03522, Aziarechcha, Kletsk district) – up to 1,200 people.
- Russian Navy’s 43rd Vileika communication center (military unit 49390, vicinity of Vileika) – up to 250 people;
- Mazyr (Bokau) airfield – about 250 people;
- Ziabrauka airfield – about 250 people;
- Baranavichy airfield – about 30 people;
- the 313th Military Prosecutor’s Office of the garrison (Minsk, Azhura str, 4) – up to 10 people;
- the 484th Military Investigation Department (Aziarechcha, Kletsk district) – up to 10 people.
In early December, BELPOL reported that a Russian military facility will be built in 2025 on the territory of the 1405th artillery ammunition base (military unit 42707, Vialikaya Harozha, Asipovichy district). The facility will include “facilities for accommodation of personnel and vehicles.” The reason for the construction of the facility is currently unknown. The connection of the construction with the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus “has not been confirmed yet.”
5.2. Movements of military equipment. Aviation activity
The intensity of movements of military equipment by public roads remained low compared to November. The movements were related to the deployment of units of the Russian Armed Forces in Mazyr and Homiel districts (for more details, see paragraph 5.1 of the review). More details on the movements of military equipment can be found on the map.
No movements of the Russian Armed Forces by rail were recorded.
In December, the aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces increased more than twofold compared to November. This was due to Vladimir Putin’s visit to Minsk in early December.
The following transport and passenger aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces were recorded arriving in Belarus:
- Machulishchy airfield: passenger aircraft – 1 An-148; military transport aircraft – 3 IL-76.
- Minsk National Airport: military transport aircraft — 5 IL-76.
As of January 1, at least 2 Su-30SM fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently deployed in Belarus (Baranavichy airfield). No flights of fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces were recorded during the month
