Military activity on the territory of Belarus on July 15-21

Aviation activity, movements of the troops by rail and roads in Belarus.

Since July 16, no Russian drones of the Shahed-136/131 type have flown into Belarus. The nature of preventive measures, which have been recently taken by the Belarusian military, allows us to conclude that the drones may again fly into Belarus.

A Tu-134 passenger aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived at Baranavichy airfield. A military cargo train with equipment of a mechanized battalion of the Belarusian Armed Forces was spotted in Asipovichy district.

Aviation activity

Aviation activity was recorded at Machulishchy, Lida, Baranavichy, Babruisk, Luninets, and Barautsy airfields. Flights of aircraft and helicopters of the Belarusian Air Force and Russian Aerospace Forces were recorded.

• On July 15-18, helicopter flights were recorded at the Brestski training ground, related to the conduct of the Belarus-China anti-terrorist training “Attacking Falcon-2024”.
• On July 16, a Mi-24 helicopter and a Su-30SM fighter of the Belarusian Air Force flew to Mahiliou and Homiel regions to intercept a Russian Shahed-136/131 drone.
• On the night of July 18, a Su-30SM fighter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Baranavichy airfield to the south of Belarus (Homiel region). Apparently, the duty forces of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces began to preventively patrol the airspace to control flying Russian drones and missiles.
• On July 18, a Mi-8 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Barautsy airfield through Lida, Smarhon and Miory districts.
• On July 20, a Mi-8 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Luninets airfield.
• On July 21, two Su-25 attack aircraft of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Lida airfield to Barautsy airfield.
• Separately, we can note activity at Babruisk airfield, probably related to the flights of Russian Shahed-136/131 drones. It is notable that helicopters often arrived at Babruisk in the morning and returned to Machulishchy in the evening. Earlier, helicopters were redeployed to Baranavichy airfield to shorten the flight time to the western border of Belarus.
• On July 15, a Mi-8 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force arrived at Babruisk airfield from Machulishchy airfield. On July 19, the helicopter flew to Machulishchy.
• On July 17, a Mi-24 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Homiel region. Later it landed at Babruisk airfield.
• On July 18, a Mi-24 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Babruisk airfield.
• On July 19, two Mi-8 helicopters of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Babruisk airfield.
• On July 20, a Mi-24 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Babruisk airfield.
• On July 21, a Mi-24 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield to Babruisk airfield.

• On July 19, a Tu-134 passenger aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces arrived at Baranavichy airfield from Moscow. On July 20, the aircraft left for Moscow. The purpose of the aircraft’s arrival is unknown.

Rail activity

• On July 19, a military cargo train with equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces was moving from Veraitsy station to Savetski station (Asipovichy). It consisted of about 30 vehicles, including BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, trucks, P-240 MB communication station (Kaiman-KAS), and freight cars. This may be related to the movements of a mechanized battalion: 1) to conduct field drills at the Asipovichski training ground; 2) to the regions of Belarus bordering Ukraine.
• On July 21, a military cargo train with equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces was moving from Homiel-Niatsotny station to Homiel-Pasazhyrski station. It consisted of 2 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled artillery units and 4 freight cars. Judging by the direction of the train, the equipment could be moved for repair to the 1868th artillery armament base, stationed in Homiel.

Movements by road

• Single vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces were repeatedly spotted in Mazyr district. The movements were related to the activities of the anti-aircraft missile divizion of the 1530th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, deployed at Mazyr (Bokau) airfield.
• Small convoys (up to 10 pieces) and single vehicles of the Belarusian Armed Forces were spotted in Slonim, Brest, Mazyr, and on some sections of the М1, М2, М3, М6, М9, R67, and other highways.

General conclusion on current situation

1) Since July 16, no Russian drones of the Shahed-136/131 type have flown into Belarus. The expert community expressed a number of opinions about the reasons for these flights. Both political (Moscow “waved a finger” at Lukashenka for sending signals to the West) and technical (technical malfunctions of the drones; due to the work of Ukrainian EW systems (for example, the Pokrova GPS spoofing system) the drones changed their flight trajectory and flew into Belarus). Each of the versions has its own set of arguments. In our opinion, the most probable reason for the Shahed-136/131 flights into Belarus is technical.

Despite the lack of an official reaction from officials of the Lukashenka regime, the military started taking preventive actions to neutralize the threat posed by drone flights. Here we can note the flight of a Su-30SM fighter to the south of Belarus during another missile attack against Ukraine, as well as helicopter arrivals at Babruisk airfield. The latter may be related to the intention to reduce the flight time to the border with Ukraine to intercept drones flying into Belarus.

The choice of Babruisk airfield is not accidental, as it is the closest to the border with Ukraine. At least to the section of the border through which the Shahed-136/131 drones most often flew into Belarus (the area of the Palessie State Radiation-Ecological Reserve).

Taking into account the facts mentioned above, we can state that the actions taken by the Belarusian military do not rule out more flights of the Shahed-136/131 into Belarus.

2) In the report on military activity on the territory of Belarus for July 8-14, we wrote that military intensification on the western border of Belarus (“northwestern direction”) can be expected in the near future. One can come to this conclusion based on Lukashenka’s statements made at the meeting on July 13.

The “northwestern direction” includes the sections of the Belarus-Lithuania and Belarus-Latvia borders. The task of covering these directions is performed by the Northwestern Operational Command of the Ground Forces.

It is notable that on July 17, Aliaksandr Bas (previously head of the Main Directorate for Combat Training) was appointed the new Commander of the Northwestern Operational Command of the Belarusian Armed Forces. His predecessor (Aliaksandr Naumenka) was promoted and appointed Deputy Minister of Defense. It can be expected that the new commander will be active in the “northwestern direction” and will initiate drills in the areas bordering Lithuania and Latvia.