Military events review

West-2025 drills, formation of new units, and flights of Russian drones: review of military events in Belarus in September

Information in the review is provided as of October 1, 2024

Summary

In September, another escalation on the Belarus-Ukraine border continued. In total, a group of ≈1600 people was redeployed to Homiel region. These events are an informational campaign of the Lukashenka regime and do not pose a military threat to Ukraine. 

Systematic flights of Russian drones into Belarus continued. At least two out of 29 drones detected in September were shot down by the Belarusian Air Force and Russian Armed Forces. There is every reason to believe that the flights of the Shahed-136/131 drones will continue in the future.

The level of Russia’s military presence hasn’t changed significantly. No increase in the number of the military group in Belarus has been recorded. The activity of units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed in Belarus hasn’t changed and remains low. The main factor that can significantly change the situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus is the West-2025 drills.

Up to 100 mercenaries of PMC Wagner stay in Belarus, who continue to systematically train law enforcers of the Lukashenka regime. No other activity of the mercenaries has been recorded.

The general medium-term forecast of the military situation in Belarus remains the same. Currently, there is no reason to expect an offensive by the Russian Armed Forces from the territory of Belarus, as well as an increase in their military presence. Involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in combat operations against Ukraine is still unlikely. 

Chapter 1. Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. Internal Troops

1.1. Organization of combat training

On September 24, during a visit to the Obuz-Liasnouski training ground, Aliaksandr Lukashenka spoke about the need to “shake up and bring [the army] to an ideal state.” According to the politician, the Belarusian Armed Forces and the power bloc of Belarus as a whole should undergo a set of inspection measures in the “winter period.”

This means that at the beginning of the 2024/2025 academic year (note that the academic year in the troops begins on December 1), we can expect a wave of “sudden inspections” of the troops. The practice of recent years (2022/2023 and 2023/2024) shows that the new academic year in the troops already begins with the inspection of certain units of the Belarusian Armed Forces. 

West-2025 drills

In early September, a delegation of the Russian Armed Forces paid a working visit to Minsk. One of the purposes of the visit was to prepare for the West-2025 joint strategic drills between Belarus and Russia. In particular, reconnaissance (visual observation) of deployment sites of the troops for the period of the drills was carried out. 

In February 2024, Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin said that drills with the regional group of troops would be held on the territory of Belarus in 2025. And in September, a similar statement was made by State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich.

It was unofficially reported that the drills would be one of the largest in the history of the regional group of troops. The drills will involve the latest military equipment and weapons, including air defense systems, the latest generation of tanks and EW equipment. Special attention will be paid to practicing interaction between the Russian Armed Forces and the Belarusian Armed Forces in hypothetical conflicts involving high-tech threats such as UAVs and cyberattacks. Also, as part of the drills, “the tasks of integrating new military units that will arrive in Belarus by the end of 2024 from [the Russian Armed Forces] will be practiced.” 

For more details about the drills, see the document of October 1, “West-2025 drills to be held in Belarus?”

Main combat training activities in the Belarusian Armed Forces

The most notable combat training activities of the Belarusian Armed Forces include the following:

1) Tactical and specialty drills were held in the 250th Guard and Service Separate Special Battalion. During the drills, special attention was paid to practicing the provision of personnel and the survivability of the command post of the Western Operational Command. Countering sabotage and reconnaissance groups, deploying elements of the command post, its camouflage and protection were practiced.

2) Battalion tactical drills were held in one of the units of the 19th Mechanized Brigade, which was additionally staffed with conscripts. The purpose of the drills was to improve the soldiers’ practical skills in preparing for and performing tasks during defense and defensive combat. The drills were conducted on terrain in the area bordering Lithuania.

3) Special operational drills of the Signal Troops were held under the direction of the Chief of the Communications Directorate of the General Staff. During the drills, the combat use of communications units in “changed organizational and staff structures” was practiced. It was not specified what the changes were.  The drills were based on the principle of integrated use of various types of communications (fixed and field), as well as the use of “civilian” infrastructure. The drills involved more than 150 communications centers, 500 pieces of equipment and almost the entire personnel of the Signal Troops (about 1500 servicemen).

4) Command-staff drills with the 120th Mechanized Brigade took place at the Barysauski training ground. As part of the drills, an episode of defensive combat was staged. The servicemen practiced ambush operations, destruction of the conditional enemy penetrating into the defense of troops and conducting a counterattack. Throughout all stages of the drills, the focus was on the use of UAVs.

5) It was reported that joint computerized command-staff drills were held. During the drills, they simulated the results of the combat operation of the unified regional air defense system of Belarus and Russia. No other details about the drills were reported.

6) A tactical training session was held at the Damanava training ground for commanders of units of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces. During the training session, exercises were held on the organization of access control, the accommodation of personnel in the field, the organization of the storage of missiles and ammunition, and the protection of military equipment and personnel against UAVs. There was also a simulation of practical actions on repelling an attack by a sabotage and reconnaissance group.

Drills in Russia

In September, control exercises on missile attack management were held with the Missile and Artillery Troops of the Belarusian Armed Forces at the Kapustin Yar training ground (Russia). The drills involved units of the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade and the 465th Rocket Brigade. During the exercises, for the first time, launches were made from the V-300 Polonez-M MLRS at a range of 300 kilometers. Also for the first time, launches from the Smerch MLRS were performed at a range of 90 kilometers. It was reported that Tochka-U tactical missile systems were involved in the drills. 

The Belarusian military continued training at the “joint combat training center” of the Belarusian Armed Forces and Russian Armed Forces. For example, on September 20, servicemen of the 4th Separate Tank Battalion of the 19th Mechanized Brigade went to the 333rd combat training center (Mulino training ground) for training. According to the battalion commander, they will gain experience on combat operations from their [Russian] colleagues. 

CSTO drills

In September, the Belarusian contingent took part in the Interaction-2024 command-staff drills with the CSTO Collective Rapid Response Forces, the Search-2024 drills with intelligence forces and means, and the Echelon-2024 drills with logistics forces. All maneuvers were conducted in Kyrgyzstan. 

Belarus was represented by the 103rd Airborne Brigade (Belarusian Armed Forces), a special rapid response detachment (Internal Troops), the Almaz counterterrorism unit (Ministry of Internal Affairs), representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and cadets of the Military Academy. It was noted that the Belarusian military would “gain a great experience in mountain training, […] which we cannot get on the territory of Belarus.” In total, the CSTO drills involved over 1500 servicemen and up to 300 pieces of equipment from Belarus, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.

At the final stage of the Interaction-2024 drills, the blockade of a settlement where the conditional enemy has established control was practiced, as well as the release of hostages. And during the Echelon-2024 drills, logistics units practiced tasks in mountainous terrain.

On September 26, servicemen of the peacekeeping company of the 103rd Airborne Brigade and one of the OMON units went to Kazakhstan to participate in the Unbreakable Brotherhood-2024 command-staff drills with the CSTO Collective Peacekeeping Forces. The maneuvers will be the final stage of a set of joint drills conducted by the CSTO in 2024. During the drills, it is planned to practice the preparation and conduct of a peacekeeping operation by the CSTO Collective Peacekeeping Forces.

Main combat training activities in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Internal Troops

The most significant event of the combat training in September was the drills on suppressing illegal armed formation. The drills were held in Stolin (Brest region), which is located 12 kilometers from the border with Ukraine. 

The drills were first held on September 3-4. No other details were reported.

For the second time, the Stolin-2024 drills were held on September 10-11. They were attended by the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its territorial bodies, commanders of the Internal Troops and Special Operations Forces, chairmen of the Brest and Homiel Regional Executive Committees, etc. According to the concept of the drills, the town’s defense forces were confronting an illegal armed group that was trying to seize the settlement. During the drills, the tactics of combat in urban environments, the use of UAVs and armored vehicles, the search and detention of “militants,” the release of hostages, etc. were practiced. 

Units of the “special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs” (special militia units, Internal Troops units, etc.) were involved in the exercises. The Ukrainian Kozak-5/Kozak-7 armored vehicle was used during the drills. The vehicle was probably captured by PMC Wagner mercenaries and provided to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the drills. This is not the first time that Ukrainian trophy vehicles have been used in combat training exercises. 

Other combat training activities included the following:

1) During the month, field drills with units of the 4th Militia Brigade (military unit 7404), the 1st Patrol Battalion of the 1st Militia Brigade (military unit 5448), Buran special forces detachment, etc. were reported to be conducted.

2) Exercises on protection of transportation infrastructure facilities and combating illegal armed formations were held in the 9th Separate Special Battalion of the 7th Militia Brigade (military unit 5530).

3) As part of the training, which took place in the Grom special forces detachment (military unit 6317), the servicemen practiced firing while riding an ATV, as well as maneuvers on the Volat V1 armored vehicle.

4) Regular trainings with the Chest’ special forces detachment continued (consists of volunteer members of the Chest’ Association of Veterans of Special Forces units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Almost every weekend, exercises were held with the unit at the Valoushchyna training center, with special focus on UAV control. 

Also, a training session was held with the Chest’ special forces detachment in September. The main objective was to conduct combat coordination of the detachment. The main focus during the training session was on learning new weapons, working with UAVs, practicing interaction with artillery, and combat coordination of combat groups. More than 200 reservists were drafted. Exercises with reservists were conducted by instructors with combat experience (former PMC Wagner mercenaries), as well as officers from the combat training and sports center of the 3rd Special Forces Brigade (military unit 3214).

5) A training session for crews of combat vehicles and BTR-80 of the special forces detachments of the Internal Troops took place at the Belaya Luzha training center.

6) Servicemen of the special rapid response detachment and members of the Almaz unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs took a training course in the specialty of “diver-exploder.” The training took place on the basis of the 31st separate maritime training center of the Rosgvardiya (military unit 7628).

On September 26, it was reported that on the instructions of Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Kubrakou, the readiness of volunteer formations of special units of internal affairs bodies and the Internal Troops, their armament, logistics and logistical support would be inspected “in the near future.” No other details about the inspection were given.

Work of former PMC Wagner mercenaries

In September, training of servicemen by former PMC Wagner mercenaries continued. 

It is known that the mercenaries continue to work with servicemen of the Internal Troops on a systematic basis. However, cooperation with the mercenaries is still not publicly recognized. Earlier we wrote that the press service of the Internal Troops stopped mentioning PMC Wagner in its publications after Lukashenka’s criticism. Since the beginning of February 2024 and up to the present time, the mercenaries have been publicly referred to as “experienced instructors” or not mentioned at all.

For this reason, the ongoing cooperation can be judged by circumstantial evidence (mainly photos and videos). It is known that in September, the mercenaries conducted: 

There were no reports about trainings with the Belarusian Armed Forces by the mercenaries. At the same time, the State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus said, “We take into account and make good use of the experience of PMC Wagner units, which are deployed in Belarus. Their instructors are in our units and share the practical skills that they acquired during [the war in Ukraine], during combat operations in other places and in other hot spots around the world.”

It was also reported that during the tactical medicine exercises, servicemen of the 202nd Mechanized Battalion of the 6th Mechanized Brigade practiced the skills learned under the guidance of representatives of Group W (former PMC Wagner). It was not specified when exactly the former mercenaries conducted exercises with the servicemen.

Separately, it should be noted that during the month, the Russian AbakanAir cargo airline made another flight from Belarus to the Central African Republic (one of the countries of deployment of the former PMC Wagner in Africa). This fact shows that the mercenaries continue to be stationed in Belarus.

1.2. Movements of military equipment and aviation activity

The main factors that affected the intensity of movements of military equipment and aviation activity in September were: 1) redeployment of troops to Homiel region (for more details, see paragraph 1.3 of the review); 2) flights of Russian UAVs of the various types into Belarus (for more details, see paragraph 1.11 of the review); 3) a number of combat training activities in Belarus and Russia (for more details, see paragraph 1.1 of the review).

The intensity of recorded movements of military equipment slightly decreased compared to August. As in previous months, there was nothing unusual in movements of the equipment of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Most of the movements were concentrated in the vicinity of the areas where the garrisons and training grounds of the Belarusian Armed Forces are located.  Especially active movements were recorded in the vicinity of large garrisons (Hrodna, Minsk, Barysau). The activity of movements of equipment was noted in Homiel region.

More details on the movements of military equipment can be found on the map of military activity.

The intensity of movements of the Belarusian Armed Forces by rail decreased almost three times compared to August. During the month, trains with military equipment were spotted in Slonim, as well as at Parechcha (Hrodna district), Zaslonava (Lepel district), Mazyr and Veraitsy (Asipovichski district) stations.

Information on the movements of military cargo trains can be found on the map of military activity.

The intensity of flights of the Belarusian Air Force increased slightly compared to August. During the month, 378 flight activity events were recorded.

A “flight activity event” means the takeoff or landing of an aircraft or helicopter at an active airfield (airport) or landing sites located on terrain (including inactive airfields).

During the month, aviation activity was recorded at the following airfields (main base and reserve):

Traditionally, the greatest activity was recorded at Machulishchy airfield. This is due to the specifics of the 50th Combined Air Base, a unit of the Belarusian Air Force, which has the largest number of aircraft and helicopters stationed at the airfield. High activity at Babruisk airfield is notable. This is due to the deployment of a group of troops in Homiel region and the deployment of a small number of aircraft at the airfield (for more details, see paragraph 1.3 of the review).

During the month, activity was recorded at landing sites. Among them, we can distinguish the following:

All the mentioned activity (except for Vosautsy airfield) is related to the deployment of the group of troops in Homiel region. It is unknown what the activity in Belaya Dubrova (Kastsyukovichy district) is related to.

Flights of helicopters to military training grounds (Brestski, Ruzhany, Obuz-Liasnouski, Barysauski, Losvida) were recorded. The flights were often related to combat training activities. In addition, some of the activity was related to the movements of Aliaksandr Lukashenka.

The following notable features of aviation activity can be noted:

1) On September 2-6, 8-9, 12, 14-17, 21-22, flights of fighters of the Belarusian Air Force from Baranavichy airfield were recorded in the southern and southeastern regions of Belarus. A significant part of these flights were related to interceptions of Russian UAVs (for more details, see paragraph 1.11 of the review).

2) On September 4, 6, 22 and 28, flights of Mi-24 helicopters of the Belarusian Air Force from Machulishchy airfield were recorded in the southeastern regions of Belarus.

3) On September 3, 5, 7 and 9, flights of Su-25 attack aircraft were recorded at Babruisk airfield. On September 11, 4 Su-25 attack aircraft of the Belarusian Air Force flew to the permanent deployment airfield in Lida.

4) On September 6, 10, 11-12, 18, 20 and 28, a Mi-8 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchchy airfield to Charatsianka (Zhytkavichy district) and Ziabrauka airfield. The flights were related to the inspection of the group of troops located in Homiel region by officials of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus.

5) On September 17-20, 23 and 27, flights of Yak-130 combat trainers of the 116th Assault Air Base of the Belarusian Air Force were recorded at Babruisk airfield.

6) On September 26, a Mi-24 helicopter of the Belarusian Air Force flew from Machulishchy airfield along the border with Lithuania.

1.3. The group of the Belarusian Armed Forces deployed in the border regions. Escalation of the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border

Situation in the area bordering Lithuania

On September 1, a military cargo train with equipment of the 19th Mechanized Brigade arrived at Hudahai station (Astraviets district, Hrodna region). A tactical group consisting of up to 2 motorized rifle companies, a tank company, and a mortar battery was redeployed to the area bordering Lithuania. In total, 38 pieces of equipment, ≈250 personnel. The redeployment is related to combat readiness and mobilization inspection of the 19th Mechanized Brigade, as well as drills. 

On September 14-15 (after the drills were completed), units of the 19th Mechanized Brigade were withdrawn to their permanent deployment point.

Situation in the area bordering Ukraine

On August 10, Aliaksandr Lukashenka spoke about the violation of the Belarusian airspace by Ukrainian UAVs. During the briefing, Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin said that given the situation in Ukraine and Russia’s Kursk region, Lukashenka had given instructions “to strengthen the group of troops in Homiel and Mazyr tactical directions.” 

As of October 1, the following units of the Belarusian Armed Forces were concentrated in Homiel region:   

1) Belarusian Armed Forces:  

2) Internal Troops, KGB, MIA:

Thus, as of October 1, the number of troops concentrated near the border with Ukraine could be ≈1600 people. This is the minimum confirmed number of troops of the established group. The number of the redeployed units is being clarified as new information becomes available.

On September 8, Valfovich said that the Belarusian group cannot pose a threat to Ukraine: “The [Belarusian] group of forces, the number that the Ukrainians claim we brought, that we brought 4000 servicemen or so, is many times smaller than the group that is on the neighboring territory of Ukraine. Today, there are about 14,000 [Ukrainian] servicemen near the state border [of Belarus].” If we interpret the official’s words literally, the number of the Belarusian group in Homiel region will not exceed 4000 people.

The local authorities allocate civilian infrastructure for the deployment of units of the Belarusian Armed Forces. For example, the media reported about the transfer of a kindergarten building in Hrebeneuski (Zhytkavichy district, Homiel region) and a part of a student dormitory in Loyeu (Homiel region) to the military. According to available information, servicemen of the Belarusian Armed Forces were also accommodated in one of the dormitories in Lelchytsy (Homiel region).

The number of troops redeployed to Homiel region doesn’t pose a military threat to Ukraine. These events are an informational campaign of the Lukashenka regime in response to the launch of the military operation in Kursk region.

Some units of the Belarusian Armed Forces have been in the border area with Ukraine for more than a month (since August 10-11). As the experience of using units of the Special Operations Forces of the Belarusian Armed Forces to “cover the border with Ukraine” shows, their rotation was carried out on average every 2 months. Therefore, we can expect that in early October, the first rotation of units of the Belarusian Armed Forces, redeployed to Homiel region in August, will begin.

Judging by the experience of previous escalations of the situation on the Belarus-Ukraine border, it is possible that all units of the Belarusian Armed Forces (with the exception of the Special Operations Forces) can be withdrawn to the permanent deployment points at any moment. However, there are no obvious preconditions for this at the moment.

Therefore, the most likely scenario for the development of the situation in the near future is: 1) rotation of the units that arrived in Homiel region in August will take place in early October; 2) the “new shift” will stay in the border area with Ukraine until early December.

As of the end of September, there were no signs of the beginning of the rotation.

1.4. Territorial defense and national home guard. Military commissariats

Territorial defense. National home guard

In September, training sessions with conscripts of the territorial troops were held in four regions of Belarus at once.

1) On September 3-27 – in Kamianiets district (Brest region). 140 reservists were to be drafted.

2) On September 3-26 – in Hrodna district (Hrodna region). 105 reservists were to be drafted.

3) From September 10 to October 3 – in Vitsiebsk and Orsha districts (Vitsiebsk region). About 250 reservists were to be drafted.

In September, activities related to the formation of national home guard detachments were reported. For example, a training on the procedure for the formation of national home guard detachments was held in Salihorsk. Similar trainings were also reported in Kletsk, Maladzechna, Miadziel districts, etc.

Separately, we can mention the trainings with national home guard detachments that took place in Smaliavichy district. During the training, the issues of the formation of national home guard detachments, obtaining weapons and ammunition, and tactical medicine were discussed. During the practical part, they practiced countering a sabotage and reconnaissance group trying to blow up a reservoir dam. Similar trainings are planned to be held every six months.

Military commissariats

In September, the regular conscription for compulsory military service took place. Representatives of military commissariats noted an increase in the number of those wishing to undergo military service under contract instead of compulsory service. For example, 70% of conscripts from Barysau and Krupki districts will serve under contract. There was also activity of representatives of military units, who visited military commissariats across the country, agitating conscripts to undergo military service under contract. 

Another of the activities of military commissariats in September was the conscription of reserve officers for military service. During the month, military commissariats drafted at least 124 reserve officers for service. In total, in August-September, at least 134 reserve officers were drafted. According to media reports, 998 reserve officers are planned to be drafted in 2024. Conscription of reserve officers is carried out on the basis of Decree No. 179 of 29.04.2024. The peculiarity of the conscription of officers in 2024 is that the number of officers to be drafted was classified. 

Due to technical work on the pravo.by website, it is temporarily impossible to get up-to-date statistics on the number of criminal cases against conscripts who evaded conscription for compulsory military service. In September, at least 4 sentences were reported in criminal cases of evasion of conscription for compulsory military service (p. 1 Art.435 of the Criminal Code).

1.5. Military training sessions with reservists

The following units of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Internal Troops and Border Guard Service were reported to be holding training sessions with reservists in September:

In total, at least 440 people were drafted to the training sessions in these units.

It was also reported that 110 reservists were sent to military training sessions by military commissariats of Hrodna, Brest and Minsk regions. 

In September, 495 reservists were drafted to training sessions in Kamianiets district (from September 3), Hrodna district (from September 3), Vitsiebsk district and Orsha district (from September 10) (for more details see paragraph 1.4 of the review). 

According to the updated information:

Thus, the total number of reservists drafted to military training sessions in September can be at least 1045 people. And in total since the beginning of 2024 – 11,549 people. We note that this is the minimal number of reservists who have undergone military training sessions. In reality, their number may be several times higher, since open sources publish only fragmentary data on conscription to military training sessions. 

The Ministry of Defense of Belarus hasn’t reported the number of conscripts to be drafted to military training sessions in 2024. A total of 9000 people were planned to be drafted to training sessions in 2023.

1.6. Supplies of new weapons to the troops. Activity of the military-industrial complex

Supplies of new weapons to the troops

On September 6, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin said that “over the past few months”, the Belarusian Armed Forces had received 10 BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, as well as 10 Tigr special vehicles (GAZ-233014). All of these vehicles are made in Russia. The official did not specify which units received the new vehicles. We assume that the Tigr vehicles were probably supplied to the Special Operations Forces.

We should note that in 2021-2023, the Belarusian Armed Forces received 3 battalion sets of BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, which entered service with:

Also, a small number of BTR-82A were transferred to the 72nd Joint Training Center and the Military Academy of Belarus to train cadets.

The BTR-82A battalion set consisted of about 40 vehicles, including:

In January 2023, it was reported that the 103rd Airborne Brigade of the Special Operations Forces was to receive BTR-82A armored personnel carriers “in the near future.” It is likely that the new batch of armored personnel carriers was supplied to the 103rd Brigade. 

Currently, there are no photo-confirmations of the use of the new equipment by the Belarusian military.

Procurement of new weapons

On September 4, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus published a tender for the purchase of 9 Autel UAVs: 1) four EVO MAX 4T; 2) four of EVO MAX 4N Standard Bundle; 3) one Dragonfish Standard. They plan to spend $199,324 (BYN 631,000) on the purchase. We can state that every year the number of UAVs purchased for the needs of the army increases, and their nomenclature expands. Given the need to comply with all formalities, we can expect the delivery of the equipment to the military not earlier than early 2025.

Announced plans for rearmament

1) On September 6, Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin said that more than 100 armored weapons and equipment are undergoing major repairs and modernization at the 140th repair plant, including 30 T-72 tanks – to the level of T-72BM2. According to the head of the Armored Vehicles Department of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, a tank battalion was transferred for modernization. The T-72BM2 tank was put into service with the Belarusian Armed Forces. 

2) The head of the Armored Vehicles Department of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus said that a decision was made to provide 100% of armored vehicles of the Belarusian Armed Forces with UAV protection equipment. There was no information about the timeframe for the implementation of the decision.

3) On September 12, it was reported that the 2566th Radio-Electronic Weapons Repair Plant had completed the upgrade of a batch of BM-21 Grad MLRS to BM-21B BelGrad-2. The equipment has passed acceptance tests and is ready to be transferred to the troops. It has not yet been reported which unit of the Belarusian Armed Forces will be the first to receive the modernized Grad systems. It is known that BM-21 Grad MLRS are in service with at least seven brigades of the Ground Forces and Special Operations Forces.

4) On September 13, the State Authority for Military Industry reported that an enterprise of the Belarusian military-industrial complex together with representatives of the Belarusian Armed Forces conducted experimental launches of 122-mm rockets for BM-21 Grad MLRS equipped with a high-precision guidance unit. The range of the projectiles is up to 20 kilometers. In the future, the high-precision guidance unit can be installed on rockets with a range of up to 40 km. It was noted that the modernization of standard Grad MLRS defeat devices to the high-precision level allows to significantly reduce the consumption of ammunition to achieve the set goals. There were no reports on ammunition supplies to the Belarusian Armed Forces.

5) It was reported that training of crews of the 231st Artillery Brigade to operate the V-200 Polonez MLRS was underway. No exact dates were given for the transfer of the MLRS to the brigade. Given the ongoing training of the crews, the transfer of the systems to the brigade could take place in the foreseeable future.

6) In 2024, the Chekan V attack UAV, the Berkut-3 short-range multifunctional UAV, as well as the Shapel multicopter signal detector and transponder were put into service. The start of the supplies of these weapons to the troops has not been reported.

Activity of the military-industrial complex

On September 27, it was reported that Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics together with the enterprises of the military-industrial complex were working on a highly accurate and jam-resistant missile. No other details of the project were reported. 

Support of the Belarusian military-industrial complex for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

In late July-early August, 94 cars with missiles for anti-aircraft missile systems were shipped from the 1562nd Technical Missile Base of the Belarusian Armed Forces to the 23rd Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Department of the Ministry of Defense of Russia (Oktyabrskoye, Tver region). Other ammunition deliveries were also planned for the 23rd arsenal. However, they are currently suspended. 

The probable reason is Ukraine’s UAV strike on the arsenal, which took place on the night of September 21. As a result of the strike, a significant part of the arsenal’s infrastructure was damaged. In addition to the above mentioned, insignificant deliveries of ammunition from the storage bases of the Belarusian Armed Forces were recorded in 2024. For example, the export of ammunition to Russia was recorded from the 391st Artillery Ammunition Base (a total of 19 railcars) and the 1562nd Technical Missile Base (4 railcars).

We may assume that the 1562nd technical missile base of the Belarusian Armed Forces carried out repair and maintenance of anti-aircraft guided missiles for SAM systems of the Russian Armed Forces.

1.7. Development of military infrastructure. Formation of new units. Staffing of troops, training of military personnel

Development of military infrastructure

The development of military infrastructure continued in September. 

1) Construction of a military town continues in Homiel district. The facility may be intended for: 1) units of the Southern Operational Command; 2) a new unit (brigade) of the Special Operations Forces. Construction work began in fall 2023. According to available information, preparations are currently underway for the implementation of the 2nd stage of construction of the military town, during which it is planned to install engineering infrastructure (communication lines, gas pipeline, etc.) to the future military town. The construction of the town is planned to be completed in 2027.

2) In October-December 2024, the command of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of Belarus plans to purchase 1319 airfield slabs. The products are used to build runways, parking lots for aircrafts and helicopters, etc. The slabs are purchased for the units that operate Machulishchy, Baranavichy, Babruisk and Barautsy airfields. In total, purchases of materials for the repair of artificial surfaces of 5 out of 7 operating military airfields in Belarus were recorded in 2024. 

Formation of new units in the Belarusian Armed Forces

In September, it became known about the formation of a number of new units in the Belarusian Armed Forces:

1) A new unit – the 79th Separate Rocket Artillery Divizion – was formed in the 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces (military unit 12180). The divizion is armed with the V-300 Polonez-M MLRS. The systems entered service with the brigade back in November 2023, but the formation of the divizion became known only now.

2) On September 11, it became known that the 62nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (military unit 96871) is being formed in Hrodna. The unit is the successor of the 62nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (military unit 16377), which was disbanded in 2011. Infrastructure is being prepared to accommodate the regiment in military town No. 99 “Vishniavets”. 

Currently, the Western Operational Command includes the 147th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (military unit 96869), which is stationed in Babruisk. At the same time, the troops of the Western Operational Command provide cover for the western operational direction, which includes Hrodna and Brest regions. Therefore, all units of the Western Operational Command (except for the 147th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment) are stationed in Hrodna region and Brest regions.

Probably, due to the geographical remoteness of the 147th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, a decision was made to include it in the forming Southern Operational Command. Instead, the 62nd Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment is to be formed within the Western Operational Command. This decision seems logical and probably expedient from the economic point of view. Currently, the 147th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment is the first unit that will (probably) be included in the Southern Operational Command.

3) On September 24, during a meeting at the Obuz-Liasnouski training ground, Aliaksandr Lukashenka said that Belarus had established a new unit staffed with soldiers under contract: “While looking for good specialists, we decided to establish another unit. With those smart, intelligent, strong people, but already adults, on a contract basis, who have once served in the army or in some units.” No other details about the unit were given. Based on Lukashenka’s statement, we may assume that former mercenaries of PMC Wagner were recruited to the unit.

4) During the month, a number of statements were made about the formation of new UAV units within the Belarusian Armed Forces. Currently, each mechanized and reconnaissance battalion and artillery divizion of the Western Operational Command has UAV units equipped with modern reconnaissance and attack drones. Also, production of devices for dropping different types of ammunition from multi-rotor UAVs has been organized in mechanized brigades using a 3D printer. 

It was not specified whether this referred to the formation of regular units (e.g., a UAV platoon) in each battalion (divizion) or whether each of the mentioned units had non-staff UAV operators (note that in the absence of such a position in the organizational structure of the units, servicemen holding other positions were trained to operate UAVs). 

As of January 2024, some of the UAV operators in mechanized brigades were non-staff. It is known for certain that mechanized and artillery brigades, as well as Special Operations Forces brigades, have formed regular UAV units – aviation detachments.

On September 26, it was reported that it was necessary to increase the training of UAV specialists “due to the prospect of establishing new specialized UAV units.” No other details about the formation of new units were given. It is likely that the Ministry of Defense of Belarus is considering the establishment of specialized UAV units (e.g., separate battalions) in the operational commands of the Ground Troops and Special Operations Forces.

Formation of new units in the Internal Troops

On September 4, Commander of the Internal Troops Mikalai Karpiankou spoke about plans to change the organizational and staff structure of the troops. Thus, “in the near future” it is planned to create separate units for snipers and UAV operators. No other details about the new units have been reported yet.

Formation of “volunteer” units

On September 26, Lukashenka said that on his instructions, those who had served in special units were put on special record to form volunteer units: “In the near future, we will inspect all [volunteer] units. Why I insist on this: this special training cost us a lot. It’s a lot of money to train such special forces.” According to the politician, the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen “should have its own unit with its own weapons.” According to the politician, the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen should also “have its own unit with its own weapons.”

On September 26, First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops said that Lukashenka had ordered the formation of “special volunteer units” in all law enforcement agencies. 

Since 2023, volunteer special forces detachments (Chest’, Smerch, etc.) of more than 1500 people have been formed in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system from among citizens who previously served in special units. The soldiers of the units are provided with everything they need to carry out combat tasks, “taking into account the realities of modern combat.” Training sessions are held with them on a scheduled basis. Former mercenaries of PMC Wagner take part in their training.

Staffing of units, training of military personnel 

During the month, officials regularly raised the topic of training UAV operators for the Belarusian Armed Forces. 

For example, it was reported that the 927th Center for the Training and Use of UAVs was training multirotor UAV operators for the units of the Western Operational Command. After theoretical and practical training, the acquired UAV control skills will be implemented during combat training exercises.

On September 24, chairman of the central council of DOSAAF of Belarus Andrei Nekrashevich said that starting from 2024, DOSAAF would train UAV operators. The official said, “By 2026, we will be able to fully provide law enforcement agencies with drone operators.”

In addition, new military departments will be created in educational institutions to train “in-demand specialists” in UAV and EW operation. And the UAV department will appear at the Military Academy. 

1.8. Tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus

There was no new information related to TNWs in Belarus in September. 

As we have repeatedly previously noted, currently there is still no reliable data that would confirm the deployment of TNWs on the territory of Belarus.

1.9. Amendments to legislation in the military sphere

No amendments to military legislation were reported in September.

1.10. International military cooperation

In September, a delegation of representatives of the Signal Troops of Uzbekistan paid an official visit to Belarus. There were also reports on visits by military delegations from Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea. Representatives of the African countries got acquainted with the combat training system of the Belarusian Armed Forces, as well as the training of military personnel. They also observed command-staff drills with the 120th Mechanized Brigade (for more details, see paragraph 1.1 of the review).

During the month, the accreditation procedure for the military attaches of Saudi Arabia and Hungary was completed at the Ministry of Defense of Belarus.

A number of CIS events were reported. For example, on September 18, a meeting of the Coordination Committee for Air Defense under the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS member states was held in Minsk. During the meeting, they considered the issues of improving the unified air defense system of the CIS member states, as well as strengthening bilateral and multilateral military cooperation in the field of air defense. The XIII plenum of the International Union of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation and Navy (DOSAAF) of the CIS was also held in Minsk.

Within the framework of the SCO, the XXI Meeting of the Expert Working Group of the Meeting of Defense Ministers of the SCO member states held in Beijing was notable. A delegation from the Belarusian Armed Forces took part in the event. During the meeting, the issues of strengthening regional and international security in the SCO area were discussed.

A number of bilateral cooperation events were reported. In the context of cooperation with China, we can mention the visit of representatives of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese Army to the Research Institute of the Belarusian Armed Forces. Also, within the framework of the 11th Xiangshan Security Forum (held in Beijing on September 12-14), the Belarusian Defense Minister met with the head of the Chinese military department, Dong Jun. During the meeting, they discussed the status and prospects of bilateral military cooperation. They noted the intensification of cooperation in military training and peacekeeping activities. 

A number of meetings of Belarusian officials with the leadership of Azerbaijan took place at the 5th International Defense Exhibition “ADEX-2024” (held in Azerbaijan). For example, the Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces held a meeting with the Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan. And the Chairman of the State Authority for Military Industry met with the Minister of Defense Industry and the Deputy Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan.

During the month, a military delegation from Iran visited the Military Academy of Belarus, as well as 3 military faculties of civilian universities. The delegation was headed by the deputy head of the General Directorate for Training and Military Education of the General Staff. The purpose of the visits was to study the possible training of military specialists for the Iranian Armed Forces.

In September, a military delegation from Russia headed by Deputy Defense Minister Pavel Fradkov paid a working visit to Belarus. As part of the visit, the delegation had a working meeting with the Deputy Minister of Defense of Belarus for Logistics. The chairman of the State Authority for Military Industry also held a meeting with the director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation of Russia at the ADEX-2024 exhibition. During the meeting, the parties discussed the adjustment of the regulatory legal framework in order to optimize and accelerate the terms of mutual supplies of military products. 

A separate issue in the context of international military cooperation was the Treaty on Security Guarantees between Belarus and Russia. On September 2, Belarusian Foreign Minister said that the document was planned to be signed in December 2024. The official said, “The treaty will set the principle of using nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, as well as other methods of defense of both countries, which are part of the Union State.” Later it was reported that the treaty would be signed by the 25th anniversary of the formation of the so-called “Union State” (in December 2024). On September 9, the State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus said that the final draft (of the Treaty) was planned to be presented “in the near future.”

We should also note the statement made on September 18 by Valery Revenka, the head of the Department for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. The reason for the statement was the fact that representatives of Belarus were not invited to observe the Steadfast Defender drills, which were held in spring 2024. According to the officials of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, this was a gross violation of the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011. In this regard, Revenka asks, “Should Belarus continue the practice of inviting foreign observers when large-scale operational and combat training events will be held on our territory?” The statement can be considered an element of preparations for the West-2025 drills to be held on the territory of Belarus (for more details, see paragraph 1.1 of the review).

1.11. Flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus

In September, Russian UAVs, which were initially launched for strikes against the territory of Ukraine and reconnaissance, continued to fly into the airspace of Belarus.

During the month, the flights of 29 Russian UAVs were recorded. Of these:

Duty forces of the Belarusian Air Force were used to intercept 26 out of 29 UAVs. It is not known what happened to most of the UAVs afterwards. We can state that: 2 UAVs were shot down, 1 UAV flew to Latvia, part of the UAVs returned to the territory of Ukraine.

Note that in September, for the first time:

The most resonant event was the flight of 8 UAVs of the Shahed-136/131 type on September 5. According to available information, an air defense unit of the Russian Armed Forces located at Ziabrauka airfield (for more details, see paragraph 2.1 of the review) shot down one UAV over Homiel. A household building was damaged as a result of the falling debris. The UAV was probably shot down by the Pantsir-S1 system. This is the first known case of the Russian military hitting its own UAV in the airspace of Belarus. The fact of participation of the Russian military “in repelling the UAV attack” was confirmed by State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus Aliaksandr Valfovich.

In addition, a Su-30SM fighter of the Belarusian Air Force shot down another UAV. This is the second such case (the first one was recorded on August 29). 

The Belarusian military confirmed the facts of shooting down the UAV on September 5. The incident was followed by the reaction of propagandists. The main narratives were: 1) Ignoring the fact that the downed UAVs were Russian; 2) Implying that the UAVs could be Ukrainian; 3) Emphasizing the coordinated work of the Belarusian and Russian military, etc. 

The most resonant official reaction to the Russian UAV flights was the statement of Aliaksandr Lukashenka made on September 17. The politician said, “We have agreed through channels with the Ukrainians that we will not mention the facts of Russian and Ukrainian drones flying into our territory in the media.” Lukashenka also said that both Russian and Ukrainian UAVs flew into Belarus: one Ukrainian UAV crashed near Babruisk. The statement was Lukashenka’s first comment on the topic of Russian UAVs in Belarus.

There was no new information regarding the reasons for the flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus. Two versions remain the most probable: 1) Changed tactics of using UAVs by the Russian military. During missile attacks, Russian UAVs fly into the territory of Belarus (where they can’t be shot down by Ukrainian air defense units) to subsequently fly to the territory of Ukraine. Such actions may, for example, prolong the duration of missile attacks. 2) Due to the work of Ukrainian EW systems (e.g., the Pokrova GPS spoofing system).

We can note a trend towards an increase in the number of flights of Russian UAVs into Belarus. While in July-August there were 21 flights of Russian UAVs, there were 29 in September. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that UAV arrivals will stop in the near future. This is also indicated by another extension of the flight restriction zone for all types of civil aircraft (including UAVs) in the south of Belarus (according to NOTAMN O0597/24). The restrictions will remain in force until December 31, 2024.

Chapter 2. Russia’s military activity in Belarus

2.1. Russian group in Belarus

The situation with the group of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus didn’t change significantly in September compared to previous months.

Russian military continue to be stationed at Mazyr (Bokau) and Ziabrauka airfields. According to available information, one anti-aircraft missile divizion of the 1530th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces (military unit 31458) is stationed at each of the airfields. The regiment is part of the Eastern Military District and was redeployed to Belarus to take part in the Union Resolve-2022 drills back in early February 2022. 

The presence of the Russian military at MAzyr (Bokau) airfield is confirmed by regular movements of vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces in Mazyr and its vicinity. So far, it hasn’t been publicly reported in what status the Russian military are present at the airfields. At the same time, in March 2022, Lukashenka said that he had asked the Russian president to leave “some forces to cover the Homiel direction.”

Thus, as of October 1, 2024, the number of Russian military personnel stationed in Belarus can be estimated at about 2000 people. Of these:

Also, the following Russian military law enforcement agencies continue to work in Belarus: the 484th Military Investigation Department (Kletsk district, Minsk region) and the 313th Military Prosecutor’s Office of the garrison (Minsk). The number of personnel involved in these structures could be estimated at dozens of people.

At the end of September, there was probably another rotation of the Russian contingent located at Ziabrauka and Mazyr (Bokau) airfields.Previously, we recorded the rotation of the Russian military in December 2023, mid-February, late March, late April, late June and late July 2024. On average, arrivals of military transport aircraft at Homiel airport are recorded once every month and a half.

2.2. Movements of military equipment and aviation activity

The intensity of movements of military equipment by public roads didn’t change compared to August. Regular movements of equipment of the Russian Armed Forces were recorded in Mazyr district, where the Russian Armed Forces are permanently deployed (for more details, see paragraph 2.1 of the review). More details on the movements of military equipment can be found on the map.

No movements of the Russian Armed Forces by rail were recorded.

In September, the aviation activity of the Russian Aerospace Forces increased almost two-fold compared to August. This was primarily due to a number of CIS events that took place in Minsk (for more details, see paragraph 1.10 of the review).

Transport and passenger aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces continued arriving in Belarus in September:

As of October 1, the following aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces are permanently deployed in Belarus: Baranavichy airfield – 4 Su-30SM fighters. During the month (on September 18-19 and 26), flights of fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces were recorded at Baranavichy airfield.

General conclusions

  • In September, a new round of escalation on the Belarus-Ukraine border became the key event for the Belarusian Armed Forces and the power bloc of Belarus as a whole. In total, a group of the Belarusian Armed Forces with the number of ≈1600 people was redeployed to Homiel region. These events are an informational campaign of the Lukashenka regime in response to the beginning of the military operation in Kursk region. These events do not pose a military threat to Ukraine.

    • Russian UAVs (Shahed-131/136 and reconnaissance) continued to fly into Belarus. In general, a trend towards an increase in the number of UAVs flying into Belarus can be noted. Currently, there is no reason to claim that the situation with UAV flights will be radically resolved in the coming months. Further escalation of the situation can be expected in this area.

    Another notable process that was clearly evident in September was the formation of the Southern Operational Command. In particular, the construction of infrastructure for its units continues. However, of greatest significance is the launch of the process of forming the units that will become part of the Southern Operational Command.

    The general direction of the national security activities implemented by the Lukashenka regime still indicates an increasing (in the regime’s opinion) probability of Belarus’ participation in the war. At the same time, the participation of the Belarusian Armed Forces in combat operations on the side of Russia still looks unlikely.

  • The general conclusion on the situation with the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Belarus didn’t change. All the conclusions given in the review for February remain valid.

    • No increase in the number of the Russian group in Belarus has been recorded. The rotation of air defense units of the Russian Armed Forces stationed at airfields in Homiel region was recorded. 

    Currently, the main factor that can significantly change the situation with the Russian military presence in Belarus is the West-2025 drills. Active preparations for the drills are currently underway. The available information allows to state that the maneuvers will be held, among other things, on “terrain” near the Ukrainian border. Special attention must be paid to preparations for the drills in the coming months.

     The level of activity of the Russian Armed Forces in Belarus in September remained low.

  • All the conclusions regarding the prospects for the deployment of PMC Wagner mercenaries in Belarus given in the review for October 2023 remain valid. A small number of the mercenaries (up to 100 people) are still stationed in Belarus, who serve as instructors for Belarusian military structures (mostly the Internal Troops). 

    • There are no signs of a complete shutdown of mercenaries’ activities in Belarus so far. Moreover, the former mercenaries were probably recruited into one of the newly established units of the Belarusian Armed Forces.

    The level of activity of PMC Wagner in Belarus in September remained very low.